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Abstract 
 
CFOs and other managers depend on consultants to provide advice on management 
control systems (MCS) and the expertise to implement these systems. However, there is little 
evidence on the determinants of the consultant‘s advice about whether managers should adopt 
management control systems. I use multiple methods to investigate this ill-understood research 
question. In study 1, I interview senior practitioners to better understand the context and identify 
the manifestations of two common persuasion tactics in the consulting setting, specifically social 
proof and scarcity (Cialdini 1993; 2001), which are likely to influence the consultant‘s advice to 
the manager. 
In study 2, I conduct an experiment using professional consultants to investigate whether 
the consultant‘s advice to adopt an MCS depends on its distinctiveness (i.e. whether or not the 
manager‘s competitors have adopted the tool) and the manager‘s competence. I predict and find 
that distinctiveness triggers the persuasion tactics of social proof or scarcity, and that the 
consultant applies these tactics based on the manager‘s competence. Consultants are more likely 
to advise a distinctive versus non-distinctive MCS to an exceptional manager, while they are 
more likely to advise a non-distinctive MCS to an average manager. I provide evidence that 
consultants apply different persuasion tactics based on the competence of the manager. I also 
provide evidence that consultants believe that their advice will benefit the manager on multiple 
key performance indicators (KPIs). Consistent with persuasion theory, differences in these 
anticipated benefits explain the consultant‘s advice to the exceptional manager, but not to the 
average manager. Finally, I discuss practical and theoretical implications of these studies. 
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I. Introduction 
 
This dissertation examines whether the consultant‘s advice to adopt a management 
control system (MCS) depends on the competence of the manager whom the consultant advises 
and the extent to which the manager‘s competitors have adopted the MCS. The consultant is an 
external agent who provides CFOs and other managers with advice on the adoption of an MCS.
1
  
MCS adoption introduces substantial uncertainty into firms as a result of direct costs, slowly 
materialized benefits, and resistance to change within firms, which necessitates persuasion 
tactics by the consultant to alleviate managers‘ uncertainty (cf. Argyris 1990a; 1990b; Argyris 
and Kaplan 1994).
2
 I argue that the extent to which the manager‘s competitors have adopted an 
MCS—which I label the distinctiveness of an MCS—triggers persuasion tactics that enable the 
consultant to provide additional justification for the manager to adopt an MCS (cf. Cialdini 1993; 
2001).
3
 The appropriateness or salience of these justifications depends on the manager‘s 
competence, and the consultant advises the manager to adopt an MCS based on the match 
between the tactic and the manager‘s competence.  
                                                 
1
I define management control systems (MCS) as the ―information-based routines and procedures managers use to 
maintain or alter patterns in organizational activities‖ (Simons 1995, 5).  Consultant-recommended MCS adoptions 
and changes include technologies such as business intelligence, customer relationship management, enterprise 
resource planning, and knowledge management, in addition to practices and ideas that directly affect MCS such as 
activity based costing, the balanced scorecard, and six sigma and total quality management.  Consulting practitioners 
often refer to their advice as a solution. 
2
 There are numerous anecdotes about the positive and negative effects of these MCS, such as  ERP technology on 
accounting information.  In a recent example, Overstock.com CEO John Byrne blamed the implementation of an 
Oracle ERP system for errors that led to a restatement, which reduced revenue by $12.9 million and increased 
cumulative net loss by $10.3 million (Kanaracus 2008).  In another case, Levi-Strauss blamed a 98% drop in 2008 
Q2 earnings on its SAP system, which crashed and prevented its distribution centers from receiving and fulfilling 
orders for one full week in April 2008 (Sterlicchi 2008). 
3
 The distinctiveness of an MCS refers to the extent to which it differs from the MCS of other managers in the 
industry or some other reference group.   
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 This study is the first to provide theory and evidence on how the consultant influences 
MCS, which form the foundation of the collection and reporting of accounting information 
within firms. Research has identified numerous determinants of MCS adoption, including the 
firm‘s strategy, size, growth, age, complexity, and management characteristics, among others (cf. 
Davila and Foster 2005; 2007; Sandino 2007; Davila et al. 2009). Managers, however, depend on 
consultants to provide advice about potentially beneficial MCS and the expertise to implement 
these systems within firms, because MCS are often complex and managers lack the requisite 
knowledge to self-select. As such, evidence on the role of the consultant adds to our 
understanding of differences in the information available to managers when they choose MCS, 
and the ultimate design and effectiveness of MCS. 
 I test the research questions above using multiple methods in two studies. In the first 
study, I conduct a series of semi-structured interviews with senior consulting practitioners 
(average experience = 23.6 years), to validate the practical and theoretical relevance of my 
research questions and to identify how my constructs of interest operate in this setting. Interview 
responses suggest that consultants employ persuasion tactics as a means to reduce the manager‘s 
uncertainty and resolve disagreements. Common persuasion tactics in this setting, specifically 
the use of rhetorical devices such as ―best practices‖ and ―customization,‖ correspond to the 
persuasion principles of social proof and scarcity, respectively (cf. Cialdini 1993). Responses 
also suggest that consultants are sensitive to the characteristics of the managers whom they 
advise and persuade, and formulate quick conclusions about the competence of the manager. 
Although consultants are aware that they engage in persuasion, the interviews do not provide 
empirical evidence of how consultants apply these tactics, which forms the objective of study 2. 
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In the second study, I use an experiment with professional consultants to test the relations 
among the constructs identified in study 1. The experiment presents consultants with the case of 
a CFO whose firm manufactures customized products and experiences customer disputes as a 
natural aspect of business. Combined with the firm‘s decentralized accounting structure, these 
disputes cause problems on multiple dimensions, including receivables management, division 
performance evaluation, and customer satisfaction. Despite the CFO‘s doubts about the benefits 
of decentralized accounting, the firm‘s divisional managers like the decision support provided by 
the current structure. The experimental case controls for determinants of decentralization such as 
strategy, size, manager tenure, complexity, and growth. 
The primary dependent measure is the likelihood with which the consultant advises the 
adoption of a relatively new SAP MCS that centralizes and automates credit management and 
collections. The experiment also measures the extent to which the consultant advises change in 
the underlying accounting processes, as well as predicted effects of the advice on key 
performance indicators and the effectiveness of the firm‘s controls. The case manipulates the 
distinctiveness of the MCS between-participants: by stating that either seven of the firm‘s 
competitors (non-distinctive) or none of them (distinctive) have adopted the MCS. The case also 
manipulates manager competence within-participants; the CFO either has an excellent track 
record and is in high demand by other firms (exceptional competence) or has an average track 
record and is in moderate demand (average competence) (see Figure 1). 
I motivate my predictions from persuasion theory. A non-distinctive MCS triggers the 
social proof tactic, while a distinctive MCS triggers the scarcity tactic, both of which allow the 
consultant to provide simple and incremental justifications for MCS adoption (cf. Cialdini 1993; 
2001). The likely appropriateness of these tactics differs based on the match between the 
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manager‘s competence and the justification highlighted by the tactic. Specifically, the adoption 
of a distinctive MCS offers the exceptional manager the opportunity to outperform others, while 
the adoption of a non-distinctive MCS offers the average manager the opportunity to perform no 
worse than others (cf. Zwiebel 1995). I predict that the consultant is more likely to advise a 
distinctive MCS to an exceptional manager, but is more likely to advise a non-distinctive MCS to 
an average manager.  
The results of study 2 are consistent with my predictions listed above. In supplemental 
analyses, I provide evidence that consultants employ different persuasion tactics by selectively 
sharing social proof information with average managers and scarcity information with 
exceptional managers. I find that consultants believe that their advice will benefit the manager on 
multiple accounting indicators, but that the exceptional manager is more likely than the average 
manager to realize these benefits. 
Moreover, consultants believe that differences in their advice to exceptional managers are 
driven by genuine differences in the benefits that exceptional managers will realize from the 
advice (i.e., exceptional managers will actually benefit more from a distinctive versus non-
distinctive MCS). This belief is consistent with the scarcity tactic that promises competitive 
advantage. Differences in consultants‘ advice to average managers are not driven by differences 
in expected benefits, which is consistent with the social proof tactic that merely ensures the 
absence of disadvantages. 
This study makes multiple contributions to both the accounting literature and the broader 
literature on persuasion. Specifically, this study is the first to examine the role of the consultant 
in MCS adoption, specifically to advise the manager on whether an MCS adoption is appropriate. 
I broaden the understanding of known determinants of MCS adoption by identifying consultant-
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driven variations in the information and investment opportunities available to managers when 
they adopt MCS, and the likely effectiveness of the implemented systems.
4
 
In addition, this study contributes to the broader literature on persuasion, as it is the first 
study to theorize the joint effects of competence and distinctiveness on the application of 
persuasion tactics and the provision of advice. This connection between persuasion triggers and 
advice provision is new to the broader literature on persuasion. I identify key features of the 
consulting setting, which are ignored in psychology-based studies on advice and persuasion, and 
theorize the operation of these effects in a rich, applied setting. Thus, I provide a baseline and 
framework for research examining whether and how persuasion triggers and tactics operate in 
consulting and other applied settings.  
My findings should interest practitioner and scholarly audiences in multiple accounting 
domains, including management accounting and auditing. For example, these findings suggest 
that consultants tend to target their recommendations to adopt MCS where persuasion attempts 
and ultimate adoptions are most likely to be successful and not necessarily where they are most 
needed.
5
 The consultant is also likely to provide a first mover advantage to exceptional 
managers, which suggests that average managers may need to invest more heavily in the 
solicitation of expert advice in order to achieve first mover advantages. 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter II defines key 
constructs; chapter III describes study 1; chapter IV describes study 2; and chapter V includes 
conclusions and future research directions. 
  
                                                 
4
 My experiment holds constant several known determinants of the investment opportunity set, such as assets in 
place and research and development activities (cf. Skinner 1993). 
5
 I measure and find no differences in the consultant‘s assessment of control effectiveness. 
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II. Definitions of Constructs 
 
Consultants and Consulting 
 A consultant is an external expert whose primary function is to provide advice.  
Consulting refers to the service provided by the consultant and includes the provision of advice 
to managers. For example, the consultant‘s advice may present new options to the manager or 
enhance the precision of the manager‘s existing choices. 
Advice and Persuasion 
Advice takes multiple forms. Examples of advice include a recommendation for or 
against a particular course of action, or the provision of information about alternative decisions 
or decision-making processes (Bonaccio and Dalal 2006; Dalal and Bonaccio 2010). People seek 
and receive advice in order to improve their judgments (cf. Sniezek and Buckley 1995; Yaniv 
and Kleinberger 2000; Kadous et al. 2011), to build confidence and make their judgments appear 
more justifiable to others (Heath and Gonzalez 1995; Kennedy et al. 1997), and to share risk or 
diffuse responsibility for consequential decisions (Harvey and Fischer 1997; Gold et al. 2010). 
The advisor or consultant does not have decision authority and therefore differs from a decision 
maker.  
The preferred form of advice by decision makers is often the receipt of additional 
information about decision alternatives (Dalal and Bonaccio 2010). When people advise others 
or receive advice from others, relative to when they decide to seek information for themselves, 
they tend to have stronger preferences for unique or new information (Van Swol and Ludutsky 
2007; Dalal and Bonaccio 2010) and exhibit weaker confirmation biases (Jonas and Frey 2003; 
Jonas et al. 2005). Thus, advisory settings lead advisors and advisees to demand new or different 
information. Advisors are often expected to expand the action or choice set that is available to 
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decision makers, either by identifying new choices or reducing the uncertainty surrounding 
existing choices. 
In most experimental studies, advisors are neutral as to whether advisees follow their 
advice (Bonaccio and Dalal 2006), whereas real-life advisors such as consultants have incentives 
for clients to follow their advice. In experiments that do reward advisors whose advice is 
followed, advisors employ available means to ensure that advisees follow their advice. For 
example, there is evidence that advisors strategically inflate their confidence levels, which leads 
to increased use of their recommendations by decision makers (Sniezek and Buckley 1995; 
Hollenbeck et al. 1998). 
In accounting, advice has primarily been studied as a means to influence and improve the 
judgments of auditors. Evidence from these studies links advice to the justifiability of judgments. 
Specifically, auditors believe that seeking advice makes their judgments more justifiable, even if 
the advice is not followed (Kennedy et al. 1997). Moreover, the degree to which the advisor‘s 
conclusion is well-justified influences auditors‘ perceptions of advice quality and, under some 
conditions, the extent to which auditors follow advice (Kadous et al. 2011). In contrast to these 
auditing studies, I focus on consultants who advise managers on the controls of their firms. In 
this setting, the consultant provides justification as a means to persuade the advisee to follow the 
recommendation, not as a means to defend the recommendation. 
Advice often contains or entails persuasion. Persuasion refers to a process of 
communication that influences another person to adopt an idea, attitude, or action (Cialdini et al. 
1981; Cialdini 1993). Note that advice and persuasion frequently co-occur, because a provider of 
advice must often actively persuade the decision maker to follow the advice. While the 
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consultant provides advice, s/he also influences the manager to value the advice and to purchase 
the consultant‘s services.  
Persuasion Tactics 
Evidence suggests that, in order to convince a manager to follow his or her 
recommendations, the consultant‘s advice is likely to include justifications that are consistent 
with core persuasion tactics (Cialdini 1993; 2001; Cialdini and Goldstein 2004). These tactics 
are means to reduce the persuasion target‘s uncertainty about changing beliefs or actions and 
provide ―reasons‖ to change that are incremental to a complete analysis of costs and benefits.6 
Cialdini (1993; 2001) identifies six primary tactics. First, the scarcity tactic suggests that people 
are more likely to comply with a request when they believe that compliance would give them 
access to exclusive information or benefits. In other words, managers are more likely to act in 
accordance with the consultant‘s advice, if doing so offers a competitive advantage. Second, the 
social proof tactic suggests that managers are more likely to comply with a request if others have 
already complied.
7
 In other words, managers are more likely to act as the consultant advises 
them to act, if having done so has benefited similar managers or firms. 
Third, the authority tactic argues that people are more likely to comply with the requests 
of experts versus non-experts (cf. Cialdini 1993). For example, a manager may be more likely to 
follow advice as the consultant‘s expertise becomes more evident through the inclusion of 
credentials on his or her business card (e.g. ―Ms. Consultant, PhD, CPA‖). Fourth, the 
reciprocity tactic is based on the norm of exchange that people comply with a request when the 
requester has done something for them. For example, charities that solicit donations by mail 
                                                 
6
 These persuasion tactics are also sometimes referred to as ―heuristics.‖ 
7
 The social proof principle arises from Festinger‘s (1954) Social Comparison Theory, which argues that people 
evaluate their own actions and beliefs in comparison to others, especially similar others. 
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frequently include small gifts such as address labels in an attempt to increase the recipient‘s 
likelihood of donation. Fifth, the liking tactic suggests that people comply with the requests of 
people whom they like. The sixth tactic, the consistency tactic, suggests that people are more 
likely to comply with a request when they believe that compliance is consistent with their prior 
actions. For example, special interests that solicit donations may first ask a potential donor to 
sign a petition for the cause. Consequently, an actual donation will appear consistent with the 
donor‘s signature of the petition.  
In order to provide the cleanest and most parsimonious characterization of this new 
setting, I assume a one-period setting with little prior interaction between the consultant and the 
manager. The principles of authority, social proof, and scarcity are consistent with this 
assumption. Because expertise is a necessary condition for someone to be a consultant, I do not 
expect to observe meaningful variation in the application of the authority principle in this setting. 
Multiple features of the consultant‘s setting may influence the availability and application 
of persuasion tactics. In order to conduct a valid test (both internally and externally) of the 
consultant‘s advice, a study must account for how features of the consulting setting influence the 
application of persuasion tactics and the provision of advice. These features include the tension 
between the consultant‘s incentives to provide beneficial advice to the manager and the 
substantial uncertainty and cost that the consultant‘s advice imposes on the manager. To better 
understand how persuasion and persuasion tactics operate in the consulting setting, I move to 
study 1 to examine specific manifestations of persuasion tactics among consultants.  
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III. Study 1 
 
Introduction 
Study 1 is a field study that consists of semi-structured interviews with senior consulting 
practitioners. I first gather qualitative data that validates the practical and theoretical relevance of 
my research questions in this consulting setting. The institutional knowledge that I gather in this 
study will enable me to develop a more precise theoretical lens to inform and enrich the more 
formal investigation in study 2, and to prevent the hasty development of explanatory theories (cf. 
Peecher and Solomon 2001). 
In particular, this study examines whether and how persuasion operates in the consulting 
setting and identifies variables that moderate the consultant‘s application of persuasion 
principles. A deeper examination of the consultant‘s decision context allows me to determine 
which persuasion tactics are commonly used by consultants, how the tactics manifest in this 
setting, and if any features of the consulting context trigger the use of these tactics.  
Setting and Method 
Research Setting: Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) Consulting 
ERP is an information technology tool that integrates business functions, such as 
accounting, finance, human resources, and inventory management, into a single system with one 
source of data. ERP is the basis of multiple MCS. The adoption of ERP is expensive and time-
consuming, with the average adoption costing $6.1 million and taking 18 months to complete 
(Gartner Research 2008). Firms depend on the expertise of consultants to implement ERP. 
Accounting is a central component of most ERP systems, which have a substantial impact 
on control and the ultimate production of accounting information. With respect to the ultimate 
reporting of accounting information, there is evidence, for example, that analysts positively 
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revise their earnings forecasts when firms announce the adoption of ERP systems (Hunton et al. 
2002). Firms not only enjoy positive abnormal returns in the window around this announcement, 
but also experience increased earnings management activity following the implementation 
(Brazel and Dang 2008). Although the adoption of ERP systems often involves substantial 
centralization of accounting, firms often implement ERP systems with varying degrees of 
centralization (Quattrone and Hopper 2005). As such, ERP consulting is well-suited for an 
investigation of the MCS adoption choices that consultants offer to managers. 
Participants and Method 
I conduct semi-structured interviews with 14 professional consultants from three large 
management consulting firms. The consultants have an average (standard deviation) of 15.9 (4.1) 
years of consulting experience, and 23.6 (6.3) years of total work experience. Seven of the 
consultants are executives with titles such as Partner, Director, or Vice President; four rank just 
below the executive level with titles such as Principal or Associate Partner; and three are project 
managers. (see Table 1 for descriptive statistics of the interviewees). 
Interview participants specialize in the use of ERP technology to re-engineer the business 
processes of firms, and the expertise of each consultant tends to comprise three dimensions. 
First, consultants often specialize in the MCS produced by a particular software vendor. Of the 
interviewees, 13 consultants specialize in SAP, while one specializes in Oracle. Second, 
consultants almost always specialize in a particular business function or process area. Eight 
consultants specialize in logistics and/or production processes, and six specialize in finance and 
accounting. Third, consultants often focus their expertise on a limited number of industries, if not 
a single industry. The industry specializations of the respondents include aerospace and defense, 
automotive, chemicals and petroleum, consumer packaged goods, heavy equipment, metals, and 
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pharmaceuticals. I can detect no substantial differences attributable to specialization in a 
particular software vendor, functional area, or industry. 
The interviews are semi-structured, as the study intends to explore the determinants and 
consequences of consultants‘ judgments and decisions (see Appendix for the list of questions). 
Accordingly, the interviews do not target questions towards technology, and participants did not 
tend to discuss technology. Rather, the questions ask interviewees to discuss the business 
objectives of their clients, their beliefs about the services and value they provide to clients, and 
the ultimate consequences on firms of their judgments and recommendations. Follow-up 
questions ask for specific examples and critical incidents that represent exceptional experiences. 
Evidence suggests that these events are salient in memory and may provide more reliable 
responses (cf. Flanagan 1954).
8
 The interviews average 46 minutes in duration and range from 
21 to 93 minutes. 
Results and Analysis 
I organize study 1 in the following manner.  The first section of study 1 presents an 
analysis of interviewees‘ beliefs about the role of the consultant and the core benefits of the 
consultant‘s advice to the manager. It provides a sense of what consultants believe they provide 
to clients. The second section presents examples of processes through which consultants fulfill 
their role. It describes two context-specific manifestations of persuasion processes that 
consultants use to convey the benefits of their advice to managers, and it provides a sense of how 
consultants believe they perform their jobs. The third section presents data and analysis on the 
                                                 
8
 The critical incident technique may lead participants to recall non-representative events, but evidence suggests that 
the prevalence of this effect may be overstated.  Lipschitz et al. (2001) ask two groups of firefighters to report the 
same events and details using either critical incident or non-critical incident techniques, and report 82% consistency 
between the two groups.  Moreover, this technique provides rich accounts of the relevant information used by 
experts, and the processes that these experts apply when they make decisions in real-life settings (Gigerenzer and 
Todd 1999). 
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aspects of the firm on which managers tend to seek the consultant‘s advice. This section provides 
a sense of the implications of the consultant‘s work. The fourth section identifies potential 
variables that lead to differences in the advice that consultants provide to managers. I frame each 
section by identifying the primary question or questions that prompt the responses that I analyze 
in the section (see Appendix for a list of interview questions).
9
  
Question 1: “What do you believe is the primary service that you provide to your clients? What 
do firms and managers expect to get when they hire a consultant?”  
Organizational Change 
 Dimaggio and Powell (1983) conceive of consultants as a source of external pressure to 
change on managers and firms. Such ―change agents‖ play a vital role in developing innovations 
and transmitting these innovations across organizational boundaries (Abrahamson and Fairchild 
1999). Internal personnel often have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo, and strongly 
resist change (Argyris 1990a). Accordingly, firms depend on external agents such as consultants 
to promote and effect change within firms, as change often does not come from within. Thus, the 
defining characteristic of the consultant‘s advice is likely to be that it promotes change in the 
practices and processes of a firm. 
Consistent with the characterization of consultants as change agents, 13 of 14 
interviewees (93%) reference the consultant‘s role in changing organizations (see Table 2 for a 
summary).
10
 All of these interviewees indicate positive beliefs about the benefits of 
organizational change. Participant 5 summarizes this perspective, ―You have to go in there and 
                                                 
9
 Because the interviews are semi-structured, I do not ask every question listed in the Appendix in every interview.  
Each interview begins with question 1, but the remaining questions are not necessarily listed in the order in which 
they are asked. Some data arise from consultants‘ responses to follow up questions not explicitly listed in the 
Appendix.     
10
 An independent coder with professional consulting experience also reviews the response data. Agreement between 
the coder and me is 91.1% (Cohen‘s κ = 0.84), and disagreements are resolved.  Differences between coders would 
not influence the analyses in study 1 or the selection of variables in study 2.  
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challenge the client‘s assumptions, challenge the status quo. I believe that‘s why people hire 
consultants in the first place.‖ As discussed above, consultants often recommend that managers 
change the architecture or processes of their firms, because managers expect consultants to think 
and act differently than internal decision makers. 
Because change is often unpopular, managers hire consultants to avoid ―being the bad 
guy.‖ Participant 2 describes his role with his clients as follows: ―People within the organization 
are not comfortable breaking bad news to others, and the willingness to break bad news to others 
decreases as you move up the organization. Executives do not want to tell people what they don‘t 
want to hear. That‘s what distinguishes consultants: consultants are willing to tell people what 
they don‘t want to hear.‖ This participant relates an interesting example of a large manufacturing 
client that ―purposefully inserted consultants as a layer between the executives and division 
managers. The consultants were a buffer that shielded the executives from the people who were 
affected by their decisions.‖ 
The responses indicate that consultants believe that their role is to educate the manager 
about new trends and practices, and to promote changes that internal personnel may not be 
willing to undertake. The primacy of change also implies that persuasion is pervasive in a 
consulting setting, as persuasion is necessary to compel firms and their employees to change 
(Argyris and Kaplan 1994). In the next section, I discuss persuasion and specific persuasion 
tactics that manifest in the consulting setting. The consultants perceive that persuasion is not 
only essential for them to sell their services, but also an integral component of the advisory 
process.  
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Question 4: To what degree do clients communicate and define their expectations to the 
consultant? How do clients do this? To what degree can the consultant shape these 
expectations? 
Question 5: How frequently do clients disagree with your judgments and how do you manage 
these disagreements?  
Persuasion Principles 
Persuasion can reduce the manager‘s uncertainty about change. In order to persuade the 
manager, it may not be sufficient for the consultant simply to provide a detailed cost/benefit 
analysis. Instead, the use of persuasion tactics provides additional and immediate justification for 
the manager to follow the consultant‘s advice. As discussed above, there are several persuasion 
tactics that consultants can use, but the interview responses seem to indicate that two tactics are 
particularly prevalent. These tactics emanate from the diffusion of a given practice, technology, 
or idea within the manager‘s context. 
“Best Practices” and the Social Proof Tactic 
 The consultant‘s opportunity to use ―best practices‖ to justify his or her advice 
corresponds to the principle of social proof (Cialdini 1993; 2001). ―Best practice‖ refers to a 
practice that the consultant has applied or knows has been applied by other firms in similar 
situations. It represents a quasi-standard within an industry and a potential source of pressure on 
managers to adopt this best practice and conform to the practices of other managers (cf. 
Dimaggio and Powell 1983). A practice adopted by others has presumed benefits and presents 
the manager with relatively less uncertainty than an unknown practice. There are also 
psychological benefits to conformity with others, and the promise of conformity is a powerful 
implicit and explicit influence tactic (Cialdini and Goldstein 2004). 
16 
 
As one might expect, change is more feasible and workable in some conditions than in 
others. The consultant does not have the authority to make changes. Rather, the manager often 
has final decision authority, and the consultant must persuade the manager to change. Thus, 
change is more likely to work when persuasion attempts are more likely to succeed. Participant 9 
confirms the consultant‘s lack of power: ―[the consultant provides] technological expertise, and 
the client specifies their business objectives and ultimately owns the final decision.‖ Participant 8 
admits, ―We can‘t force the client to do anything. We‘re not auditors that the client has to 
tolerate. We‘re here because we‘ve convinced the client or whoever that we can help them.‖ He 
continues to illustrate a common and powerful persuasion tactic at the consultant‘s disposal: ―We 
provide recommendations as to our beliefs about what‘s the best course of action, based on best 
practices, but the client decides‖ (emphasis added).  
 This reference is one of several allusions to best practices in the interviews (9 of 14, 
64%). In addition to its importance in connection to the social proof principle, ―best practices‖ is 
a loose construct. Managers view best practices as a form of safety from the uncertainty of 
organizational change, according to participant 7, but still demand departures from best 
practices: ―…there‘s always the ‗best practices argument,‘ when managers confront something 
they don‘t understand or expect, and say [to the consultant] ‗I thought you were bringing best 
practices to the table.‘ It‘s like best practices are a safety blanket to allow them to do whatever 
they want but face no consequences. For me, [best practices] are one way to make the client 
comfortable with change.‖ 
 Participant 9 expresses mixed feelings about best practices, but his response still suggests 
its effectiveness as a persuasion tactic: ―SAP has built-in best practices, though I don't like the 
phrase. One approach [to persuade the manager] is to line up the best practices and challenge 
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[the manager]: "Show me why this wouldn't work in your organization?" Consistent with the use 
of social proof as a persuasion tactic, however, participant 9 admits that ―[best practices] 
functions as a good jumping off point.‖ This participant‘s mixed feelings suggest that 
distinctiveness may also be a salient benefit for both the consultant and the manager. 
“Distinctiveness” and the Scarcity Tactic 
 As discussed above, the scarcity principle argues that managers are more likely to follow 
advice, if following advice provides exclusive benefits to the manager (cf. Cialdini 1993; 2001). 
If an MCS is relatively new—or if the manager‘s competitors have not yet adopted it—then the 
absence of widespread adoption provides the manager with the opportunity to be distinctive 
relative to competitors. Consultants comment on their emphasis on new products in seven of 14 
interviews (50%). In this setting, software and hardware vendors continuously release new MCS 
and technologies that enable these systems. Because these vendors frequently target releases to 
specific industries or process areas, a continuous stream of opportunities exists for managers to 
adopt new MCS or enhance existing MCS. Hence, the consultant frequently can offer the 
manager the chance to move first on a new MCS.  
In addition to the distinctiveness conferred by first mover status, distinctiveness may also 
be promoted to the manager as a highly customized version of a widely-adopted MCS. In this 
case, the consultant promotes a customized version of an MCS that competitors have already 
adopted in a more standardized or simplistic form. The topic of customization arouses mixed 
responses, though. Some consultants laud customization as beneficial, while others deride it as a 
primary cause of failure or as a consultant sales gimmick. Consistent with the perceived benefits 
of distinctiveness in this setting, 13 of 14 (93%) interviewees comment on customization. 
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Several responses discuss customization in conjunction with the risks of failure that consultants 
face in this setting (see Table 2).  
―Many consultants allow their clients to believe that [a new MCS] will retain all of the 
essential and unique character of their firms, and only change what the client doesn‘t like. It‘s a 
fantasy that a lot of consultants cultivate [in order] to get more business.‖ This somewhat cynical 
perspective from participant 12 suggests the importance of the scarcity principle of persuasion 
(cf. Cialdini 1993; 2001). Consultants are more likely to advance change successfully if they can 
convince the manager that change will provide some distinct competitive advantage to the 
manager‘s firm. 
In a relevant accounting example, SAP‘s facility as a transaction processing and data 
reporting system make it useful for customized report production. The creation of customized 
reporting capabilities is both common and costly. Participant 8 laments, ―Everyone thinks they‘re 
special. They think that, since SAP can provide all this wonderful information, everyone can be 
measured in their own way, and everyone who reviews the reports wants the reports written and 
formatted in their own special way. Consultants encourage this kind of stuff too often. I try to 
ask the client what information they need on the report, and standardize the reports with that 
information.‖ He continues: ―You lose a lot of the benefits of the technology, when you start 
tinkering with it. People find justifications for tinkering with it, but that‘s something that I will 
discourage until I‘m blue in the face. The whole idea [of SAP] is that everyone is working off the 
same data, until you start making it so that different people are relying on different data.‖ 
As suggested above, the use of MCS—such as those based on ERP technology—to 
enhance the distinctiveness of a client can be very expensive. When asked what justifies 
customizations to an MCS, participant 10 responds: ―A couple million dollars a year. For every 
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custom program or process, it will cost a minimum of $50-100K to develop and another $50-
100K per year to maintain. Most of the time, the justification is ‗historically, we've always done 
it this way‘ or ‗this is how we do it in this industry.‘ That‘s all well and good. I‘ll do the 
customization, but if I‘m going to impose this perpetual cost on my client, then there had better 
be some numbers to support it.‖  
Participant 14 takes a more balanced perspective and points out that is common to sell on 
either newness or customization, and that either trigger of distinctiveness can arise from the 
consultant‘s desire to help the client: ―[The manager] is often trying to manage it the best they 
can, and there's no way that the consultant can foresee [customizations]. It doesn't matter how 
much time you spend going through all the gory details.‖ She illustrates that customization 
―often occurs when the client sees new MCS and new functionalities and says 'I want this, too!'‖ 
The interviews suggest that the scarcity principle also may apply to relatively new MCS or MCS 
that are not widely-adopted, rather than to customizations of common MCS. Participant 13 
agrees that ―customization is often an excuse [for the manager] to not change. It‘s a little 
different when [the manager] really just wants the latest and greatest.‖ Both customization and 
newness seem to trigger the scarcity tactic in the consulting setting. 
In summary, consultants seem to use the social proof and scarcity principles to persuade 
managers to adopt MCS and to undertake change. The rhetorical device of best practices is a 
common manifestation of the social proof principle in consulting, as it justifies change and 
uncertainty by both emphasizing the fact that others have done it and implying that the change 
has worked. The scarcity tactic manifests as the consultant‘s emphasis on either the level of 
customization of an MCS or the newness of the MCS. Consultants seem to view customization 
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alternately as a legitimate value-adding exercise or as a hollow sales tactic, similar to how they 
view ―best practices.‖  
Question 3: On what aspects of their business do managers and firms tend to hire 
consultants? What aspects of the business do consultant’s recommendations tend to concern? 
Control as a Target of Change  
When asked about the consequences of their recommendations for firms, most 
consultants focus their responses on one or more aspects of the client‘s control systems.  In order 
to provide a sufficiently broad perspective on the effects of the consultant‘s advice, I examine the 
frequency with which consultants discuss the assignment of decision rights, provision of 
incentives, and measurement of performance. Jensen and Meckling (1995) and Brickley et al. 
(1997a) refer to these factors as rules of the game and organizational architecture, respectively, 
and argue that these factors constitute the core framework through which a firm deploys its 
controls.  
Consultants influence these control components directly and indirectly, often depending 
on the specific MCS in which the consultant specializes. While MCS such as the Balanced 
Scorecard directly influence the measurement of performance (Kaplan and Norton 1996), other 
MCS such as TQM do not influence measurement directly, but may necessitate a change in the 
measurement system in order to be adopted successfully (Brickley et al. 1997b). Alternatively, 
the consultant‘s advice can often directly affect the structure of decision rights within the 
organization. Prior literature suggests that firms may use MCS to either centralize, as in the case 
of ERP (Quattrone and Hopper 2005), or decentralize, as in the case of TQM (Wruck and Jensen 
1994). As discussed above, the primary influence of the consultant on the firm is to change 
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controls, but the direction of the change may vary by the consultant‘s area of expertise or the 
characteristics of the firm or the manager whom the consultant advises. 
The interview data suggests that consultant-recommended changes could influence all 
three components of control. In the interviews, consultants cite the decentralization of decision 
rights as a frequent target of change (nine of 14 interviewees, 64%).  A firm‘s employment of 
consultants often results in immediate changes in the decision rights of employees, as employees 
must work with consultants to understand current business practices and identify improvement 
areas. Participant 11 observes that, prior to the actual implementation of the consultant‘s advice, 
the client firm undergoes major changes in decision making structure and day-to-day employee 
responsibilities: ―When you go into a company, you basically have employees of the client who 
are taken out of their jobs and told, ‗This is your life for the next 18 months.‘ In this situation, 
you almost have to see a change in the incentives of these employees, and, as a consultant, you 
can‘t change that. You can recommend it, you can ask for it, but the client has to change that.‖ 
Thus, consultants often change decision-making structure, but may not effect concomitant 
changes in other components of control. 
 In the case of ERP, the interview data suggests that adoption tends to have direct effects 
on decision rights in an organization. Specifically, firms often use ERP to centralize or 
decentralize decision authority in one or more business unit. For example, participant 10 
observes that ―most of the time when companies decide to implement SAP, or some other 
enterprise software, they do so with the intention of standardizing their controls across business 
units. There are multiple advantages to this approach, including leveraging scale, the ability to 
transition resources from one entity to another without retraining…As it's executed in the best of 
the firms, a certain amount of standardization is required.‖ 
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 In an interesting example, Participant 6, who specializes in finance and accounting, 
describes the inability of many firms to adopt a centralized chart of accounts, even though it 
seems to defy common sense: ―Most finance people in my experience are very reasonable, very 
practical people, except when it comes to the chart of accounts. No matter how much easier and 
cheaper it would make things in the long run, there is a knee-jerk resistance to messing with the 
chart of accounts. The finance and accounting guys don‘t want to be responsible for changing the 
reporting structure or how business unit performance is measured.‖  
Although the discussions seem to suggest that consultants prefer centralization or 
standardization, it is more precise to claim that the consultant‘s interest is geared towards change 
that can provide some demonstrable benefit to the manager and his/her firm. Respondents 
indicate that standardizing or centralizing processes sometimes makes little sense, such as when 
decentralized processes are necessitated by regulations, contracts, and the maintenance of 
proprietary systems and practices. 
The evidence suggests that consultants in this setting have tremendous influence on 
accounting and control processes. The centralization of decision making is a key control 
consideration, as are incentive provision and performance measurement and reporting within the 
firm. Managers who design these controls depend on consultants to inform them about 
potentially beneficial MCS, and to advise them on the implementations of these MCS. Thus, the 
consultant plays a critical role in shaping the information and choice sets of managers who make 
accounting-relevant decisions. 
Question 6: How do you adapt your recommendations to the needs of a particular client? Are 
there any indicators that give you a sense of what solutions might be beneficial to a client? 
Characteristics of the firms? 
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Management and Leadership of the Advisee 
A firm‘s management is critical to the adoption of management control systems. The 
competence of management influences the adoption of controls and the effectiveness of these 
controls after adoption (Anderson and Young 1999; Elbashir et al. 2011). Davila and Foster 
(2005) document the importance of management by demonstrating that the CEO‘s experience 
and emphasis on planning influence the intensity of control adoption in startup firms, and even 
influence the timing with which the firm hires a CFO. In turn, more intense adoption of controls 
by managers increases their tenure with the firm (Davila and Foster 2007). Accordingly, it is 
reasonable to expect that the characteristics of a firm‘s management will influence the 
consultant‘s judgments. The importance of these characteristics to the consultant, however, is 
unclear, as is how the consultant tailors his or her recommendations based on these 
characteristics.   
Ten of the 14 consultants (71%) name competence of the (client) manager, or some 
variation thereof, as the most important determinant of success (see Table 2). Although size, 
strategy, and industry influence the consultant, the interviews indicate that leadership often 
varies substantially, even when one controls for these other influential factors. As participant 8 
states, ―It all comes down to leadership.‖ 
The interview data implies that consultants benefit substantially from active and bold 
leaders who promote the benefits of the consultant‘s recommended changes. The following 
observation by participant 10 suggests that the consultant prefers leaders who embrace change 
and provide vision for their employees: ―Those organizations that embrace change are those with 
someone with a passion for change, with a well-articulated vision for change. Not necessarily the 
CEO, but whoever is in charge of the program. It's not that you have to sell, but they have to 
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articulate the vision. Those firms that are successful are those where leadership has successfully 
articulated the benefits of change."  
While bold and active leaders may be particularly able to implement change, responses 
also indicate that general competence and ability are also important. Participant 9 states that a 
key indicator to the consultant is ―a strong project sponsor or owner, who commands the respect 
of their peers and senior management, not someone who's just there because they were made the 
project manager.‖ Several respondents spoke about ―business buy-in,‖ or the extent to which the 
employees of a firm are receptive to the consultant‘s recommendations. This ―buy-in‖ depends 
largely on the engagement and competence of the firm‘s executives. Participant 5 references his 
experience as Chief Information Officer (CIO) of a mid-sized firm: ―100% of my time was spent 
on business buy-in.‖ 
Interviewees consistently indicate that the leadership and competence of the project 
sponsor also influence employees‘ sophistication and orientation towards change. Participant 10 
asserts that the consultant can easily detect this influence and indicates a preference for highly-
competent managers: ―You can tell in five minutes. You can tell how sophisticated the 
employees are, based on the questions that they ask. Are they asking questions about costs, 
looking backwards, or about the future and how they can harness this change to benefit their 
business?‖ Participant 10‘s additional comments argue that leaders affect the sophistication of 
employees, as well: ―I‘d rather work with someone who‘s smart, who I know ultimately won‘t 
do what I ask him to do, than a dummy who won‘t do what I want him to do, but will give no 
explanation as to why.‖ 
Another important dimension of competence is the manager‘s ability to match rewards to 
desired actions. The consultant may prefer to work with a manager who is not necessarily bold or 
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active, but is detail-oriented and ensures that employees understand expectations. Participant 3 
describes the most important factors in understanding a manager and the manager‘s firm: 
―Follow the money. Where are the P&Ls and where do the P&Ls report? What‘s the 
representation of the P&Ls on the project? Who justifies the project and has the justification 
been integrated into budgeting and forecasting? Have the business units committed in their 
budgets to realize these cost reductions or other benefits of a project? If not, then [the business 
units] have not bought in.‖   
Interviewees consistently deride passive or incompetent managers. Participant 9 describes 
the signal and consequences of absent or ineffective leadership: ―After we signed a large 
contract, there was a kick-off meeting that was attended by all the consultants and a lot of 
managers and executives from the client:  about 50 people in all. The CEO of the client came to 
the podium and said all these wonderful things about what he believed the consultants could do 
for the firm, and how much he believed in these changes and supported our work. Then he said 
‗Good luck‘ and walked out of the room. We never saw him again. We were dumbfounded that 
he more or less washed his hands of the whole thing. At that moment, I should have known that 
we were doomed.‖ 
In this consultant‘s anecdote, ―doomed‖ means that the consultant had very little chance 
to effect beneficial change in the firm. The lack of highly competent executive support makes the 
implementation of the consultant‘s advice more difficult and more costly. This anecdote shares 
one example of the costs that consultants associate with unsuccessful consulting engagements. 
These costs are likely quite salient to consultants, as 11 of 14 interviewees (79%) reference the 
high reputation costs of failure. Thus, the consultant is invested heavily in the success of an MCS 
adoption and is sensitive to long-term reputation concerns. 
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In summary, the interview data suggests that consultants prefer to work with highly 
capable leaders. They value management characteristics, such as competence and openness to 
change, and multiple dimensions of competence, including technical knowledge and 
communication skills. Consultants may simply want to work with good managers, regardless of 
what characteristics make these managers exceptional. It is possible that consultants believe that 
dimensions of competence are correlated, such that superior competence on one dimension 
increases the likelihood of superior competence on another dimension. It is also possible that, 
because managers cannot implement many consultant-recommended MCS on their own, superior 
manager competence on any dimension will increase the likelihood of future success. In brief, 
consultants are sensitive to the competence of the manager, but it is unclear how this sensitivity 
influences the consultant‘s advice.   
Conclusions 
 The interview data suggests a setting in which the consultant advises change to a 
manager, but only when the consultant believes the change will benefit the manager and the 
manager‘s firm. There are high costs of failure for both the consultant and the manager. Thus, 
persuasion likely plays a critical role in the consultant‘s advice to the manager. The interviews 
highlight that the consultant‘s context may trigger two persuasion mechanisms in particular. The 
availability of best practices and the use of best practices rhetoric to persuade the manager are 
consistent with the principle of social proof (Cialdini 1993; 2001). The desire for customization 
or new products and technologies is consistent with the principle of scarcity (Cialdini 1993; 
2001). 
Interestingly, social proof and scarcity can both be triggered by the distinctiveness of the 
MCS in question, but their respective triggers occupy opposite ends of the distinctiveness 
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continuum. The consultant justifies non-distinctive MCS with social proof and justifies 
distinctive MCS with scarcity. Moreover, these tactics are pervasively available to consultants, 
as distinctiveness and non-distinctiveness together subsume a broad range of states of the world. 
The salient feature of distinctiveness, with respect to its status as a persuasion trigger, is that it 
determines whether or not the consultant reasonably can make an action seem different from the 
manager‘s reference group. This feature includes a range of narrow diffusions of an MCS 
(distinctive) and wide diffusion of an MCS (non-distinctive).   
While interviewees frequently reference distinctiveness in the form of customization (13 
of 14, 93%), distinctiveness in the form of a new MCS is also an appropriate focus of future 
inquiry for two reasons. First, the responses suggest that newness figures more prominently than 
customization in the consultant‘s sales process, and thus more prominently into the consultant‘s 
decision on how to advise the manager in the first place. Customization is more of a reactive 
process on the part of the consultant, and may even be used to make something that is non-
distinct appear distinct. Second, the conceptual link between best practices (i.e. social proof) and 
MCS newness or distinctiveness (i.e. scarcity) is quite strong. Specifically, other firms may have 
adopted the MCS (i.e. best practices exist), or other firms may not have adopted the MCS (i.e. it 
is new and best practices do not exist). 
A quote from participant 7 aptly seems to summarize persuasion issues in this setting and 
their ultimate consequences for the outcomes of the consultant‘s advice: ―Consultants often will 
barge into [a manager‘s firm] ill-equipped to understand and adapt to the client‘s culture. Indeed, 
most of them simply ignore it, arguing that they bring with them ―best practices‖ that, if followed 
properly, ensure success. Worse yet, [the manager] may buy in to the best practices pitch and 
expect their organization to fall in line without providing the leadership, guidance and assurance 
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the project team needs.‖ This quote suggests that consultants may be well-served to tailor their 
persuasion tactics to the characteristics of the manager and the manager‘s firm. It is important to 
note that what seems beneficial to one CFO may not seem beneficial to another. 
 Study 1 intends to develop my understanding of this setting, including how persuasion 
attempts manifest among consultants and the features that influence how consultants apply these 
tactics. The responses indicate that consultants know that they use persuasion to educate the 
manager, reduce the manager‘s uncertainty, and resolve disagreements, but the interview data do 
not indicate differences in the application of these tactics. The responses also provide the basis 
for a framework of assumptions and constraints to guide my investigations in study 2, which 
involves testing of the causal relationship between persuasion triggers and the consultant‘s 
advice.  
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IV. Study 2 
 
Introduction 
 This study is an experimental examination of the joint effect of persuasion triggers and 
manager competence on the consultant‘s advice to the manager. I begin with a discussion of 
research on MCS adoption in accounting and identify an absence of research on consultants. 
Based on insights from study 1, I select the distinctiveness of an MCS as a potential trigger of 
two common persuasion tactics in a consulting setting. I then draw on persuasion theory to 
develop hypotheses as to how these triggers likely influence the advice that the consultant 
provides to managers at varying levels of competence. Finally, I describe and report the results 
of an experiment that empirically tests my predictions. 
Literature Review and Theoretical Background 
Consultants and the Adoption of Management Control Systems 
 Although some studies of MCS adoption note the involvement of consultants, theory and 
evidence on role of the consultant is lacking. In particular, it is unknown under what conditions 
consultants may or may not advise a manager to adopt an MCS. The consultant has specialized 
knowledge of a given MCS, which includes technologies under broader labels such as business 
intelligence, customer relationship management, enterprise resource planning, and knowledge 
management, in addition to practices and ideas such as activity based costing, the balanced 
scorecard, and six sigma and total quality management. The consultant develops particular 
applications of these MCS to a firm and its context, and informs and advises the manager of the 
potential benefits of adopting these MCS. 
 Accounting research has documented the changes that are associated with consultant-
recommended MCS such as Total Quality Management (TQM) and Enterprise Resource 
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Planning (ERP). TQM adoption leads firms to decentralize decision-making processes, to 
introduce non-financial performance measures, and to communicate strategic information to a 
wider range of organizational stakeholders (Wruck and Jensen 1994; Ittner and Larcker 1995). 
On the other hand, ERP adoption leads firms to centralize decision-making processes and to 
employ more intense, real-time monitoring (Quattrone and Hopper 2005). 
While consultant-recommended changes require substantial investments by the adopting 
firm, the benefits of these changes are uncertain. Consultant-recommended MCS such as ABC 
(Ittner et al. 2002), ERP (Quattrone and Hopper 2005), and TQM (Wruck and Jensen 1994) have 
weak associations with indicators of performance improvement, such as return on assets, and 
these benefits are quite slow to materialize. Nonetheless, firms earn abnormal returns when they 
announce the adoption of ERP systems (Hunton et al. 2002), and the adoption of new and 
fashionable technologies enhances the reputations of the firm and its management (Wang 2010). 
In order to recognize and realize the control benefits of the MCS, they must be integrated 
and assimilated with the firm‘s culture (Chapman and Kihn 2009). This process depends largely 
on the competence of the firm‘s management (Elbashir et al. 2011). Accordingly, a great deal of 
uncertainty about the benefits of MCS adoption arises from organizational resistance to change 
(Argyris 1990a; 1990b; Argyris and Kaplan 1994). As Argyris (1990a; 1990b) notes, resistance 
to change is pervasive, and promises of the benefits of change are not sufficient to ensure that 
this resistance will not occur. In a case study of TQM adoption at Sterling Chemicals, for 
example, Wruck and Jensen (1994) observed that decentralization was unsuccessful in the first 
two years after adoption and met substantial resistance within the firm‘s hierarchy.  
Consequently, the changes associated with MCS adoption frequently have unintended 
consequences that introduce substantial uncertainty for the manager, firm, and consultant. ERP 
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systems integrate controls across the organization, for example, but also can lead to 
unpredictable and non-standardized uses of information for control purposes (Quattrone and 
Hopper 2005). ERP systems ostensibly centralize control and enable organizational growth and 
change, but also inhibit existing modes of control within firms (Dechow and Mouristen 2005). In 
any case, centralized accounting is likely to conflict with the general preferences of divisional 
managers, who prefer decentralized accounting that reduces conflict between accounting and 
non-accounting personnel (Hopper 1980).  
I argue that there are systematic differences in the advice that consultants provide to 
firms, which is likely to lead to differences in the ultimate adoption of MCS. These differences 
affect core accounting and control functions such as cash flow management, performance 
evaluation, and the delegation of decision rights. Prior research has treated variation in decision 
rights delegation, for example, as exogenous (cf. Indjejikian and Matejka 2006; Maas and 
Matejka 2009), or has ignored variation attributable to the judgments of consultants (cf. Nagar 
2002; Moers 2006). 
Assumptions of the Research Setting 
For this study, I define consultants as external agents with incentives to advise change 
and knowledge of how to apply a particular MCS to a particular manager‘s firm.11 The 
consultant‘s primary product is advice that s/he sells to a manager. I assume that this advice 
takes the form of a recommendation for or against a course of action, or the provision of 
additional information about courses of action (Bonaccio and Dalal 2006).  
At the time when the consultant decides to advise the manager, s/he knows that the 
manager has not adopted the MCS, if the manager‘s competitors have adopted the MCS, and the 
                                                 
11
 Research has characterized such agents alternately as change agents (cf. Dimaggio and Powell 1983) or 
knowledge entrepreneurs (cf. Abrahamson and Fairchild 1999).   
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apparent competence of the manager.
12
 The consultant earns fees when the manager agrees to 
adopt the MCS, but adoption increases the likelihood of organizational resistance, which 
increases the risk to the consultant‘s reputation. Reputation risks are highly salient to the 
consultant because consultants depend on reputation to signal the quality of their services and 
charge higher fees (Greenwood et al. 2005; Greenwood and Suddaby 2006).
13
 The next sections 
propose that these assumptions make persuasion a crucial part of the consulting process. 
MCS Distinctiveness and Persuasion Tactics 
Due to the likely resistance to change and the high costs of failure, the consultant must 
persuade the manager to adopt an MCS. Thus, the consultant‘s advice contains both information 
about the potentially beneficial application of an MCS to the manager‘s firm and an implicit 
request for the manager to value the advice and purchase the consultant‘s services (Cialdini and 
Goldstein 2004). Persuasion is a process of communication that influences the manager to 
change beliefs or actions (Cialdini et al. 1981). Successful persuasion attempts tend to use certain 
types of information to provide additional reasons for the manager to change, above and beyond 
the functional benefits of the MCS (Cialdini 1993; 2001).  
An MCS is likely to vary in the extent to which it has been adopted by the manager‘s 
competitors. Assuming that the manager has not yet adopted the MCS, this distinctiveness 
triggers two persuasion tactics that the consultant can use to reduce the manager‘s uncertainty 
                                                 
12
The consultant also likely has information about common determinants of control structure, such as a firm‘s size, 
strategy, growth, and organizational complexity. 
13
One could argue that the consultant incurs a specific asset investment cost in order to give credible advice to the 
manager, which is an additional incentive to provide beneficial advice to the manager.  For example, the consultant 
may need to spend time gathering information about the manager‘s firm or engaging technical experts from within 
his or her own firm. These specific investments are common in professional services such as consulting as a means 
to constrain opportunistic behavior (Sharma 1997).  Once the consultant decides to provide advice to the manager, 
the consultant has an incentive to provide advice that the manager is likely to follow, in order to recoup this sunk 
cost.   
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associated with MCS adoption.
14
 If the manager‘s competitors have not adopted the MCS, then 
the exclusive benefits of this distinctive MCS provide the manager with an additional adoption 
justification. The consultant‘s opportunity to use this information to persuade the manager 
corresponds to the scarcity tactic, which emphasizes that the benefits of an MCS are distinctive 
to the manager (Cialdini 1993). This tactic is most persuasive for people with a preference for 
distinctiveness (Griskevicius et al. 2006; 2009). 
Conversely, the manager‘s competitors may have already adopted the MCS. By 
recommending a non-distinctive MCS, the consultant offers to erase the manager‘s potential 
disadvantage relative to competitors (Cialdini and Goldstein 2004), which reduces some of the 
uncertainty that the manager faces in adopting the MCS. The consultant‘s opportunity to use this 
information to persuade the manager corresponds to the social proof tactic, which emphasizes 
that the manager will derive the same outcome from the MCS as competitors (Cialdini 1993).  
These tactics represent additional justifications for adoption. The consultant can use these 
justifications to make the benefits of MCS adoption seem less uncertain to the manager. In the 
next section, I hypothesize that the appropriateness of these justifications depends on the 
manager‘s competence. In turn, the consultant will attempt to match the persuasion tactic to the 
manager. Thus, the consultant‘s advice is a joint effect of the persuasion trigger (i.e. 
distinctiveness) and the manager‘s competence.  
Hypothesis Development 
MCS Distinctiveness and Manager Competence 
                                                 
14
 Social proof and scarcity are not the only persuasion tools available to the consultant.  The consultant‘s beliefs 
and preferences about change and about a specific MCS may likely influence their advice.  I measure these beliefs, 
but there is not sufficient variation in these variables to include them in the analyses.  This lack of variation is not 
surprising, given that consultants are a self-selected population.  Cialdini (1993; 2001) assumes that the persuader 
provides a reasonable cost/benefit analysis, among other potential persuasion tactics, and that the effects of tactics 
such as social proof and scarcity are incremental to this analysis.   
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Although the consultant introduces substantial uncertainty for the manager in advising a 
new MCS, the act of adoption also provides the manager with the immediate opportunity to 
signal his or her ability to relevant stakeholders. The consultant is likely to believe that this 
opportunity is more beneficial and persuasive to the manager if the distinctiveness of the 
adoption provides a credible or accurate signal.  
Exceptional Manager 
In a setting of relative evaluation, distinct actions provide a manager with the opportunity 
to outperform competitors, whereas non-distinct actions provide only the promise of an outcome 
that is no worse than competitors (Scharfstein and Stein 1990; Zwiebel 1995). Distinct actions 
are most beneficial for an exceptionally competent manager, who can reasonably expect to turn 
the distinct action into a positive outcome (Zwiebel 1995). The positive reputation effects of 
distinctive actions may even lead exceptional managers to ignore the advice of others (Levy 
2004) and to escalate commitment to suboptimal courses of action (Kanodia et al. 1989).  
The consultant is likely to recognize that the distinctiveness of an MCS is an incremental 
justification for the exceptional manager to adopt the MCS. Thus, the consultant can build a 
more persuasive case for the exceptional manager to adopt a distinctive versus non-distinctive 
MCS.
15
 In other words, the consultant is likely to believe that the scarcity principle is more 
compelling than the social proof principle to the exceptional manager. Accordingly, the 
consultant is more likely to advise the adoption of a distinctive versus non-distinctive MCS to an 
exceptional manager. 
H1: When the manager is exceptional, the consultant is more likely to advise the 
manager to adopt a distinctive versus non-distinctive MCS. 
                                                 
15
 I assume that the consultant‘s costs to advise the adoption of an MCS are constant across levels of distinctiveness. 
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Average Manager 
 On the other hand, the benefits of non-distinctiveness are particularly appealing to 
average managers, because non-distinct actions shield the average manager from some of the 
consequences of failure. For example, managers are better compensated when they adopt popular 
management technologies and practices, even if adoption does not improve the performance of 
their firms (Staw and Epstein 2000). An average manager may not have the ability to realize a 
positive outcome from a distinct action, but non-distinct actions signal that the manager will 
realize an outcome that is no worse than most other managers (Scharfstein and Stein 1990; 
Zwiebel 1995). The recommendation of a non-distinctive MCS provides the average manager 
with an incremental justification for adoption. The consultant, therefore, is more likely to advise 
the adoption of a non-distinctive versus distinctive MCS to an average manager. 
H2: When the manager is average, the consultant is less likely to advise the manager 
to adopt a distinctive versus non-distinctive MCS. 
 Taken together, hypotheses 1 and 2 imply a disordinal interaction of distinctiveness and 
competence.  
Method 
Participants 
 I conduct an experiment using 38 professional consultants as participants.
16
 The 
participants have an average (standard deviation) of 16.72 (6.35) years of professional 
experience and an average (standard deviation) of 15.22 (5.89) years of consulting experience. 
The participants primarily are employees of three large consulting firms. My sample comprises 
                                                 
16
 The use of professional participants is essential in this context, because the effects test how the consultant‘s 
incentives and real-world knowledge of management control systems (including costs, benefits, and implications of 
diffusion in a given industry) influence the consultant‘s advice to managers of varying competence.  
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six partners or directors, 12 principals, 14 managers, and six associates or equivalent. Seven 
participants (18 percent) report having CPA or CMA certifications and six (16 percent) report 
having Project Management Professional certifications. Also, 24 consultants (63 percent) 
indicate that their responsibilities include both sales and delivery, which implies that consultants 
in my experiment have experience both selling and implementing SAP MCS for managers
17
 (see 
Table 3).  
 I recruit participants through contacts at multiple large consulting firms. After hearing 
about the objectives of this research, four senior-level contacts agree to help recruit participants 
from within their firms. I create and host the experiment using the online Qualtrics survey tool 
and provide the link to the contacts in an email. Two of the contacts forward the link to 
colleagues and subordinates, with a brief note that encourages participation. One contact 
provides a list of consultants‘ email addresses for me to contact.18 I follow up with phone calls to 
multiple contacts to ensure that the link is indeed forwarded and that the survey is indeed 
completed. The task takes consultants an average (standard deviation) of 14.76 (9.41) minutes to 
complete, and completion times ranges from three to 51 minutes. I exclude the responses of two 
consultants who take less than five minutes to complete the task, which likely indicates a lack of 
effort. Thus, my final sample is 36 consultants.
19
 
Experimental Task and Procedures 
The experimental task asks participants to complete a Request for Proposals (RFP) for 
the CFO of a growing mid-sized firm, who is considering the adoption of a relatively new SAP 
                                                 
17
 None of these measures differ across conditions.   
18
 As I do not know how many consultants are sent the link, I cannot compute a precise response rate.  I have no 
reason to believe that response rates differ across experimental conditions. 
19
 Inclusion of these two participants in my analyses yields identical inferences with even lower p-values. 
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MCS that consolidates a firm‘s credit management and collections.20 The case states that the 
CFO knows little about the MCS, but wants the consultant‘s opinion as to whether this MCS is a 
good fit for the firm.
21
 I focus on a rapidly-growing firm with roughly $700 million in revenue, 
as firms tend to decentralize as they grow (Chenhall 2003) and such a firm is large and mature 
enough to have adopted sophisticated controls (Sandino 2007). See figure 1 for a visual depiction 
of experimental procedures. 
In the case, the firm manufactures products that are highly customized to each client and 
order. Accordingly, the firm is divisionalized and has relatively decentralized accounting and 
finance functions (Abernethy et al. 2004). Divisional managers like the decision support 
provided by decentralized accounting, and the case says they will resist changes to this structure 
(cf. Argyris 1990a; 1990b; Indjejikian and Matejka 2006). However, the CFO is concerned that 
the decentralized structure is too costly and leads to collections and credit issues, due to the 
naturally high volume of disputes that a custom producer encounters. The case describes the 
firm‘s accounting structure and underlying systems as heterogeneous, because firms often 
implement and develop their accounting systems in a haphazard manner (Quattrone and Hopper 
2005).  
The consultants primarily assess the likelihood with which they would recommend the 
SAP MCS—specifically financial supply chain management which consolidates credit 
management functions—to this firm. It is reasonable to assume that the firm has not yet invested 
                                                 
20
 The case concerns a real-life system called Financial Supply Chain Management in order to reduce noise in the 
consultant‘s beliefs about this new MCS. My professional participants are familiar with this MCS and believe that it 
is beneficial. I provide evidence of these beliefs in the results section.  Because this MCS is new—and because mid-
sized firms are not often early adopters—it is highly unlikely that participants believe that the MCS has not been 
adopted because it is non-beneficial.  
21
 This feature holds constant the manager‘s presumed knowledge about the MCS.  It is common for managers to 
know about an MCS and know what an MCS does, but lack the know-how to evaluate its costs and benefits and 
implement it in the firm. 
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fully in financial planning systems and technologies, because firms tend to adopt such controls 
much later in their lifecycles than other controls (Davila and Foster 2007).  
The case balances the costs and benefits of adopting or not adopting the MCS. On one 
hand, decentralization seems justified because the firm‘s customized products necessitate 
decision support for division managers from its accounting systems (Abernethy and Bouwens 
2000), and its rapid growth suggests the presence of information asymmetries (cf. Nagar 2002). 
On the other hand, centralization seems justified because the firm‘s strategy places high 
importance on credit management (Christie et al. 2003) and integration of information systems 
leads to improved firm performance (cf. Chapman and Kihn 2009).  
After making their recommendations, consultants receive a non-committal email response 
from the CFO that asks the consultant to deliver a presentation at company headquarters. This 
design feature intends to capture the consultant‘s willingness to invest more time and resources 
in pursuing this opportunity, and introduces a degree of interaction with the manager.  
Dependent Variables 
The primary dependent variable is the consultant‘s assessment of how likely s/he is to 
advise the manager to adopt the Financial Supply Chain Management MCS. I measure these 
assessments on a seven point Likert scale anchored by 1 = ―Very unlikely,‖ 2 = ―Unlikely,‖ 3 = 
―Somewhat unlikely,‖ 4 = ―Undecided,‖ 5 = ―Somewhat likely,‖ 6 = ―Likely,‖ and 7 = ―Very 
likely.‖ I use seven point scales, as they enable participants to best discriminate between the 
values of scale points (cf. Cox 1980). I use verbal labels for each point; these labels clarify the 
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meanings of scale points, enhance the reliability of responses, and reduce ambiguity as to the 
psychometric distance between points (cf. Krosnick 1999).
22
  
In addition to the consultant‘s advice, I measure the consultant‘s beliefs as to how likely 
it is that the firm will realize improvements on key performance indicators if the CFO follows 
the consultant‘s advice. I measure these variables on seven-point Likert scales and label the 
scales with the same verbal anchors that I discuss above. These measures are days sales 
outstanding, total cost of the accounting and finance function, ease of cross-division performance 
comparisons, and customer satisfaction. In order to test for differences in persuasion tactics, I 
measure the consultants‘ assessments as to the likelihood that they would include four persuasive 
pieces of information with their advice to the CFO. 
In order to capture the consultant‘s beliefs as to the firm‘s need for new MCS, I measure 
pre- and post-advice assessments of the effectiveness of the firm‘s accounting processes on three 
key dimensions: controlling risk to the firm‘s overall objectives, allocating decision rights 
appropriately, and enabling cross-divisional comparisons. I measure these three variables on 
seven point Likert scales, with verbal anchors 1 = ―Very ineffective,‖ 2 = ―Ineffective,‖ 3 = 
―Somewhat ineffective,‖ 4 = ―Neither effective nor ineffective,‖ 5 = ―Somewhat effective,‖ 6 = 
―Effective,‖ and 7 = ―Very effective.‖ These measures capture the consultant‘s predictions of 
how the MCS will improve the effectiveness of control processes with respect to aligning a 
firm‘s controls with its strategy (cf. Simons 1995), locating decision authority to optimize 
control and knowledge transfer costs (cf. Jensen and Meckling 1995; Brickley et al. 1997a), and 
facilitating performance evaluation decisions (cf. Demski and Feltham 1978).  
                                                 
22
 Labeling only some scale points tends to bias responses towards the selection of those points with verbal labels 
(Schwarz et al. 1991). 
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I also measure the anticipated resistance to change within the firm, the expected cost of 
adopting the MCS, the CFO‘s likelihood to follow the consultant‘s advice, and brief statements 
of the consultant‘s recommendation to the firm. Finally, the case records demographic 
information as well as manipulation and comprehension checks. 
Independent Variables 
I manipulate the distinctiveness of the MCS between-participants. In order to manipulate 
distinctiveness of the MCS, the case states that, of the ten competing firms in the industry, either 
none or seven of these firms (distinctive and non-distinctive, respectively) have adopted the 
financial supply chain management MCS. The case directs participants to assume that the firm 
and its ten competitors have similar strategy, size, and market share, thus holding these 
potentially influential variables constant.  
I manipulate manager competence within-participants by varying two indicators of 
competence. First, the case describes the manager as having either an excellent or average track 
record (exceptional and average, respectively). Second, the case describes that the manager is 
either in high demand or moderate demand by other firms (exceptional and average, 
respectively), in order to capture the market‘s perceptions of the manager‘s competence. To 
emphasize the importance of reputation to the CFO, the case notes that the CFO may be seeking 
a higher-profile position after completing this initiative (Kanodia et al. 1989; Zwiebel 1995). 
As illustrated in figure 1, the within-participants manipulation occurs after the consultant 
makes recommendations and decides whether to pursue the opportunity further, but before the 
post-test questions. Specifically, the case asks consultants to now assume that the manager has 
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characteristics of the manager competence manipulation that participants initially did not see.
23
 I 
counterbalance the order of presentation to control for order effects. Consultants then re-assess 
the likelihood with which they recommend FSCM adoption, the degree of change that they 
recommend, the likelihood with which the firm will experience improvement on four key 
performance indicators, and the relative cost of adopting the MCS. 
Results
24
 
Consultants’ Beliefs about the Experimental Case 
 In order to provide evidence of the consultant‘s beliefs about the FSCM system and the 
experimental case, I measure the consultant‘s self-reported knowledge of the system, the 
system‘s benefits, and their beliefs about the hypothetical firm in the case. On average (standard 
deviation), the participants assess their knowledge of SAP Financial Supply Chain Management, 
relative to consultants with similar experience, as 3.92 (1.18) on a seven point Likert scale 
anchored by 1 = ―Not at all knowledgeable,‖ 4 = ―Moderately knowledgeable,‖ and 7 = 
―Extremely knowledgeable.‖ This rating does not differ from the scale midpoint (t(35) = -.424, p 
= 0.671), which indicates a moderate and reasonable level of knowledge on the Financial Supply 
Chain Management MCS. 
On average (standard deviation), the participants assess the benefits of SAP Financial 
Supply Chain Management as 5.67 (0.83) on a seven point Likert scale, which is anchored by 1 = 
―Not at all beneficial,‖ 4 = ―Moderately beneficial,‖ and 7 = ―Extremely beneficial.‖ This rating 
                                                 
23
 I manipulate competence within-participants to examine consultants‘ awareness of their tendencies to provide 
different advice to different managers (Libby et al. 2002).  Because persuasion is strategic, it supports my theory to 
provide evidence that my predictions hold in a within-participants design. There also would be value in a within-
participants manipulation of distinctiveness, but I choose a design that keeps the duration of the task reasonable 
(hence, one factor manipulated within-subjects).   
24
 I present two-tailed p-values, unless otherwise noted. 
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is greater than the scale midpoint (t(35) = 12.08, p < 0.001), which indicates that consultants 
believe that the FSCM MCS is more than moderately beneficial. 
I use three measures for the consultant‘s assessment of the effectiveness of ABC‘s 
current accounting processes; specifically, I measure the effectiveness of the accounting structure 
in managing risk to the firm‘s overall objectives, giving decision authority to the appropriate 
personnel, and enabling the comparison of divisions. The mean assessed effectiveness for all 
three measures is significantly below the scale midpoint (all p < 0.001), which is anchored by the 
verbal phrase, ―Neither effective nor ineffective.‖ This finding indicates that consultants believe 
that the firm‘s accounting processes are ineffective on these key dimensions. 
Finally, consultants assess their agreement with the statement, ―Resistance by division 
managers will threaten the project‘s success,‖ on a seven point Likert scale anchored by 1 = 
―Strongly disagree,‖ 4 = ―Neither agree nor disagree,‖ and 7 = ―Strongly agree.‖ The mean 
(standard deviation) assessment of 6.61 (0.68), is significantly greater than the scale midpoint 
(t(35) = 22.78, p < 0.001), which indicates a setting of high potential resistance to change.  
In summary, consultants report having reasonable knowledge about the MCS in the case 
and perceive the MCS as beneficial. Consultants also believe that the firm‘s current accounting 
processes are ineffective and that the threat of resistance to change is very high. None of these 
results differ across conditions. 
Manipulation Checks 
 As a manipulation check for manager competence, consultants assess the competence of 
the CFO and his or her ability to implement the consultant‘s recommendations successfully. I 
compare the mean responses on these measures using paired t-tests. Assessments of the CFO‘s 
competence are significantly higher in the exceptional versus average condition (6.42 versus 
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4.37, t(35) = 12.96, p < 0.001). Moreover, assessments of the CFO‘s ability to implement the 
consultant‘s recommendations are significantly higher in the exceptional versus average 
condition (6.39 versus 4.39, t(35) = 8.38, p < 0.001). These results suggest a successful 
manipulation of CFO competence. 
 As a manipulation check for distinctiveness of the MCS, consultants assess their 
agreement with the phrases, ―FSCM is widely adopted in ABC‘s industry‖, and, ―Following your 
recommendations will give ABC a competitive advantage.‖ I compare the mean responses on 
these measures using two-sample t-tests. Agreement with the ―widely adopted‖ phrase is 
significantly higher in the non-distinctive condition than in the distinctive condition (5.67 versus 
2.44, t(34) = 9.34, p < 0.001), while agreement with the ―competitive advantage‖ phrase is 
significantly higher in the distinctive condition than in the non-distinctive condition (6.39 versus 
4.94, t(34) = -4.26, p < 0.001). These results suggest a successful manipulation of 
distinctiveness.
25
 
Tests of Hypotheses 
 In order to test H1 and H2, I conduct a 2 (distinctiveness: distinctive versus non-
distinctive) X 2 (competence: exceptional versus average) mixed design ANOVA with repeated 
measures on the competence variable. I counterbalance the order of presentation of the 
competence manipulation, and order does not influence my primary hypothesis tests  (see table 4, 
Panels A through C for cell means, ANOVA results, and simple effects tests, and figure 2 for a 
graph of the cell means). The primary dependent variable for tests of H1 and H2 is the 
consultant‘s assessed likelihood that s/he would advise the CFO to adopt the Financial Supply 
                                                 
25
 I also measure and validate that the likelihood of a successful adoption and potential reputation benefits for the 
consultant do not differ across distinctiveness conditions. 
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Chain Management MCS. Consistent with my hypotheses, there is a significant distinctiveness X 
competence interaction (F1, 34 = 5.96, p = 0.010, one-tailed).  
 H1 predicts that consultants are more likely to recommend an MCS to an exceptional 
manager when the MCS is distinctive versus non-distinctive. I test H1 using the simple effect of 
distinctiveness, given exceptional manager competence. Consistent with H1, the simple effect is 
significant (6.00 versus 5.17, F1, 34 = 3.10, p = 0.044, one-tailed). In my experiment, consultants 
are more likely to recommend a distinctive versus non-distinctive MCS to an exceptional 
manager. H2 predicts that consultants are more likely to recommend an MCS to an average 
manager when the MCS is non-distinctive versus distinctive. I test H2 using the simple effect of 
distinctiveness, given average manager competence. Consistent with H2, the simple effect is 
significant (5.28 versus 3.83, F1, 34 = 5.32, p = 0.019, one-tailed). In my experiment, consultants 
are more likely to recommend a non-distinctive versus distinctive MCS to an average manager. 
Therefore, the data support both H1 and H2.
26
 
 In order to determine whether consultants are aware of the differences in their advice, I 
also conduct a 2 X 2 ANOVA using only the first level of the competence manipulation that 
participants see (i.e. I treat the data as if it is a between-participants design). If the hypothesized 
effects are weaker or differ in a between-participants analysis, then it is reasonable to infer that 
the hypothesized effects obtain even when the consultant is made aware of the different levels of 
the competence manipulation (Libby et al. 2002). Given that persuasion is a strategic and 
conscious process, evidence that consultants are aware of differences in their judgments is 
consistent with my theory. 
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 As the data for this variable are not normally distributed, I also test my hypotheses using the nonparametric Mann-
Whitney test and the Dwass-Steel-Critchlow-Fligner test for nonparametric pairwise comparisons (cf. Hollander and 
Wolfe 1999).  I find that the simple effect of uniqueness is significant in the predicted direction for both average and 
exceptional managers (2 (1, N=36) = 4.69, p = 0.026 and 2 (1, N=36) = 4.98, p = 0.030, respectively).  Thus, my 
results are robust to both parametric and nonparametric tests. 
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The results reveal a marginally significant interaction of distinctiveness X competence 
(F1, 32 = 2.12, p = 0.078, one-tailed) (see Table 5 for results). A review of the cell means in figure 
3 reveals that the simple effect of distinctiveness given average competence (i.e. H2) is still 
significant (F1, 32 = 2.97, p = 0.048, one-tailed), but the simple effect of distinctiveness given 
exceptional competence (i.e. H1) is not significant (F1, 32 < 0.01, p = 0.473, one-tailed).  
Interestingly, the advice for the exceptional manager to adopt the distinctive versus non-
distinctive MCS is driven by the responses of consultants who are aware of the competence 
manipulation, or in other words, by those who advise the average manager first. Because H1 
appears to be strengthened by this awareness, I conclude that consultants are aware of the 
differences in their advice. 
Supplemental Analyses 
The Consultant’s Provision of Persuasive Information 
 My theory argues that consultants apply different persuasion tactics to managers with 
different levels of competence. Persuasion tactics involve the consultant‘s use of available 
information to change the attitudes or beliefs of the manager. My theory, therefore, implies that 
consultants selectively share different kinds of persuasive information (i.e. social proof versus 
scarcity information), depending on the competence of the manager. 
On a between-participants basis, I ask consultants to rate the likelihood with which they 
would include four different pieces of information in their proposal to the manager; that is, 
consultants assess this likelihood only for the first manager whom they advise.
27
 The four pieces 
are information about similar firms that had adopted a similar MCS, information about the level 
of customization that the consultant advises to the MCS, information about the consultant‘s own 
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Since I administer the experiment online, I design the experiment in this manner out of concern that response rates 
would diminish if consultants are asked to respond to too many measures or if the task  takes too long. 
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expertise, and information about the competitive advantage that the firm would enjoy if it adopts 
the MCS. The first and second measures are of primary interest in this analysis, as they reflect 
the likelihood with which the consultant would employ the social proof and scarcity principles, 
respectively.
28
 
 In order to test these persuasion process variables, I conduct two separate 2 
(Distinctiveness: distinctive versus non-distinctive) X 2 (Competence: exceptional versus 
average) ANOVAs, using either the social proof measure or the scarcity measure as the 
dependent variable.
29
 See figures 4 and 5 for graphs of cell means; see tables 6 and 7 for 
ANOVA results and descriptive statistics. For the social proof measure, there is a significant 
main effect of competence (F1, 32 = 6.09, p = 0.019), with no effects of distinctiveness (F1, 32 = 
0.24, p = 0.625) or the competence X distinctiveness interaction (F1, 32 = 0.24, p = 0.625). 
Specifically, consultants are more likely to include information about the actions of similar 
firms, and thus to employ the social proof principle, for average managers than for exceptional 
managers. This finding is consistent with my theory that consultants believe that social proof is 
more effective for average managers than for exceptional managers. 
 For the scarcity variable, there are significant main effects of distinctiveness (F1, 32 = 
4.38, p = 0.044) and competence (F1, 32 = 6.12, p = 0.019), but no interaction (F1, 32 = 1.06, p = 
0.312). The results on this variable suggest that consultants are more likely to emphasize the 
customized nature of an MCS when the manager‘s competence is exceptional versus average. 
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I frame the social proof question as hypothetical, specifically by asking consultants whether they would share 
social proof information if such information were available, to ensure that I could measure the consultant‘s 
intentions or desire to use social proof in both distinctiveness conditions. Without framing this question as 
hypothetical, it is implausible to provide social proof information in the distinctive condition.   
29
 Because this analysis uses only the between subjects results, one could also label the competence factor in this 
ANOVA as Order: exceptional first versus average first.  
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The main effect of competence is consistent with my theory that consultants believe that scarcity 
is more effective for exceptional managers than for average managers.  
 These results suggest that consultants selectively include persuasive information with 
their advice, depending on the manager‘s competence. The results provide additional evidence 
on the connection between persuasion and advice in a consulting context. In particular, the 
competence of the manager influences which potential benefits the consultant emphasizes to the 
manager. The next section addresses whether consultants believe that there are differences in the 
likely realization of these benefits. 
Control Benefits of the Consultant’s Advice  
 I measure and analyze consultants‘ beliefs about the benefits of their advice with two 
objectives in mind. First, if consultants believe that their advice will benefit the manager, then 
there is evidence that consultants do not merely provide self-serving advice to the manager.
30
 
Second, if anticipated benefits drive the consultants‘ advice, then there may be additional support 
for my theory. Specifically, if the consultant targets the scarcity tactic towards the exceptional 
manager, then the consultant believes that there is an incremental benefit for the exceptional 
manager to adopt the distinctive versus non-distinctive MCS. If the consultant targets the social 
proof tactic towards the average manager, however, then the consultant may only believe that 
there is an absence of disadvantages for the average manager to adopt a non-distinctive versus 
distinctive MCS. Therefore, my theory implies that anticipated benefits drive the consultant‘s 
advice to the exceptional manager, but not to the average manager.  
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 It is possible that consultants rationalize ex post that their advice is beneficial, but there is no reason to expect that 
these rationalizations differ across conditions. Thus, ex post rationalization may limit the conclusions for the first 
objective, but not for the second objective. 
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I measure predicted benefits by asking consultants to assess the likelihood that the firm 
will experience improvement on four key performance indicators (KPIs) if the manager follows 
the consultant‘s advice. The KPIs are total accounting and finance function cost, days sales 
outstanding, ease of cross-divisional performance comparison, and customer satisfaction. The 
assessments are on a seven point Likert scale anchored by ―Very Unlikely,‖ ―Undecided,‖ and 
―Very Likely‖ (see figure 6 and table 8 for results). 
 The results in Table 8 show the differences between manager competence conditions for 
the mean likelihood of realizing benefits on the four key performance indicators. Consultants 
assess the likelihood of improvement as higher for exceptional managers than for average 
managers on the days sales outstanding (5.39 versus 4.81, t(34) = 3.62, p = 0.001), ease of 
comparing performance (6.25 versus 5.78, t(34) = 4.07, p < 0.001), and customer satisfaction 
(5.17 versus 4.67, t(34) = 3.70, p = 0.001) measures. Consultants assess no difference in the 
likelihood that the exceptional versus average manager would reduce the total cost of the 
accounting function (4.00 versus 4.06, t(34) = -0.32, p = 0.751). Interestingly, I find no evidence 
that consultants believe that KPI improvements will vary across levels of distinctiveness (all 
t(34) < 1.32, p > 0.196). Therefore, consultants advise adoption of an MCS with differing 
likelihoods, even absent demonstrable variations in the benefits of the MCS. 
These results suggest that the consultant believes that his or her advice will benefit the 
manager. On this MCS alone, the consultant identifies operational improvements in the core 
accounting function of performance evaluation and performance improvements on financial 
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(days sales outstanding) and non-financial measures (customer satisfaction). This evidence 
suggests that the consultant‘s advice is not opportunistic.31 
The consultant‘s beliefs that the exceptional manager will benefit more than the average 
manager also open the possibility that the consultant advises MCS where they are most likely to 
succeed, not necessarily where they are most needed. This possibility is consistent with 
persuasion theory, as my theory suggests that incremental performance benefits only explain the 
consultant‘s advice to the exceptional manager, not necessarily to the average manager.  
In order to test this possibility, I conduct three 2 (Distinctiveness: distinctive versus non-
distinctive) X 2 (Competence: exceptional versus average) ANCOVAs on the consultant‘s 
advice to adopt, with repeated measures on the competence variable. I run one ANCOVA for 
each of the non-cost KPIs as a covariate.
32
 See Tables 9 through 11 for ANCOVA results. In the 
results, the main effect of competence becomes non-significant with the inclusion of the days 
sales outstanding, comparability, and customer satisfaction indicators (main effect of competence 
F1, 33 = 0.56, p = 0.459, F1, 33 = 0.04, p = 0.841, F1, 33 = 0.77, p = 0.386, respectively). The 
distinctiveness X competence interaction remains significant or becomes marginally significant, 
depending on whether the days sales outstanding, comparability, and customer satisfaction 
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 In an alternative test, I analyze the consultant‘s assessment of the relative cost to the manager of following the 
consultant‘s advice.  I ask consultants to assess, ―How much would it cost for the CFO to adopt your 
recommendations, relative to the average cost of Financial Supply Chain Management projects?‖  I measure 
responses on a five point Likert scale anchored by 1=‖Substantially less,‖ 2=‖Less,‖ 3=‖About the same,‖ 
4=‖More,‖ and 5=‖Substantially more.‖  Consultants would charge the average manager more than the exceptional 
manager (p = 0.020). Because the consultant is more likely to advise the adoption of the MCS to the exceptional 
manager, whom the consultant would charge less for the adoption, these results are contrary to the argument that 
short-term earnings maximization drives the consultant‘s advice. This reasoning assumes that the consultant‘s costs 
are similar across conditions, and I do measure and validate that reputation costs do not differ across conditions. 
Even if the consultant‘s costs to implement the MCS are greater in the distinctive versus non-distinctive condition, 
there is no a priori reason to believe that this effect explains why the consultant would be more likely to advise 
adoption of a distinctive versus non-distinctive system to the exceptional manager. 
32
 Because I measure the KPIs within-participants, I use the difference score between the two measures as the 
covariate in the ANCOVA model (cf. Judd et al. 1993). This approach yields identical inferences to an approach in 
which I include each of the within-participants KPI measures as separate covariates in each ANCOVA. 
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measure is included (interaction F1, 33 = 4.67, p = 0.047, F1, 33 = 3.04, p = 0.090, and F1, 33 = 4.32, 
p = 0.046, respectively).  
The simple effects results suggest that differences in expected benefits explain the 
consultant‘s advice to the exceptional manager, but not necessarily to the average manager.33  
When I include the comparability indicator as a covariate, for example, the simple effect of 
distinctiveness given exceptional competence becomes non-significant (F1, 33 = 1.05, p = 0.156).  
This simple effect weakens substantially when I include days sales outstanding and customer 
satisfaction as well (simple effect F1, 33 = 2.20, p = 0.074 and F1, 33 = 1.74, p = 0.098, 
respectively). Conversely, the simple effect of distinctiveness given average competence remains 
significant with the inclusion of any of the benefits measures (all F1, 33 > 2.93, p < 0.048).
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In sum, the consultant advises a distinctive versus non-distinctive MCS to the exceptional 
manager, because the consultant believes that the manager will benefit more from the distinctive 
versus non-distinctive MCS. The consultant, however, does not believe that the average manager 
will benefit more from a non-distinctive versus distinctive MCS, even though the consultant is 
more likely to advise the non-distinctive versus distinctive MCS. These results are consistent 
with the argument that persuasion tactics of scarcity and social proof drive the consultant‘s 
advice. My findings suggest that consultants advise MCS adoption in areas in which the adoption 
is most likely to succeed, especially towards exceptional managers, not necessarily where the 
MCS are most needed.
35
   
                                                 
33
 This effect is consistent with moderated mediation, in which the mediating effect of expected benefits is stronger 
in the exceptional versus average manager conditions (cf. Preacher et al. 2007).   
34
 There is no evidence that differences in the CFO‘s expected costs of adoption influence the consultant‘s advice. 
35
 Consultants do not assess differences in pre-adoption control effectiveness across conditions on any of the three 
measures that I use:  consistency with strategy, appropriate decision rights delegation, and enabling effective 
performance evaluation. 
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V. Conclusions 
 
 Although the consultant plays an important role in advising and informing managers 
about potentially beneficial MCS, this role is ill-understood in the accounting literature. I use 
both semi-structured interviews to identify how persuasion tactics operate in the consultant‘s 
decision setting and an experiment to test the conditions under which consultants apply these 
tactics. I provide evidence that the consultant advises the manager to adopt an MCS based on the 
manager‘s competence and the distinctiveness of the MCS. The persuasion tactics of social proof 
and scarcity are triggered by whether or not the manager‘s competitors have adopted the MCS 
(i.e. non-distinctive versus distinctive tool), respectively, and the appropriateness of these tactics 
differ for managers of varying competence.  
When the manager is exceptional, the consultant is more likely to recommend a 
distinctive versus non-distinctive MCS. Conversely, when the manager is average, the consultant 
is less likely to recommend a distinctive versus non-distinctive MCS. Consistent with my theory 
that persuasion drives the consultant‘s advice, I provide evidence that the consultant selectively 
includes persuasive information in his or her advice. The consultant is more likely to target 
information about the actions of other firms—in  other words, social proof information—toward 
average managers, but is more likely to target information about the customized nature of the 
tool—scarcity information—toward exceptional managers.  
I also find that consultants expect managers to realize improvements on key financial and 
non-financial indicators, including days sales outstanding and customer satisfaction, if the 
managers follow the consultant‘s advice. These supplementary findings provide evidence that the 
consultant does not merely advise non-beneficial changes in order to earn higher fees and intends 
to benefit the manager and the manager‘s firm. Moreover, differences in the expected benefits of 
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advice drive differences in the consultant‘s advice to the exceptional manager, but not to the 
average manager. These findings provide additional evidence that persuasion tactics play a role 
in the consultant‘s advice.  
These findings have important implications for scholars in multiple areas of accounting, 
including auditing, management accounting, financial accounting, and accounting information 
systems. Most importantly, I provide theory and evidence that consultants influence the 
processes through which firms measure and report financial and non-financial information, and 
illustrate the consultant‘s role in shaping the information available to managers when they adopt 
MCS. By ignoring the role of the consultant, prior research has implicitly assumed that all 
importance variation in MCS adoption stems only from managers and/or their firms. I argue that 
even the information upon which the managers base these decisions is the variable output of a 
key source of expert judgment in accounting, and that MCS adoption amounts to a joint product 
of the manager and the consultant. 
 My findings should be of interest for multiple reasons to researchers and practitioners 
interested in management control systems. I extend the understanding of the role of third parties 
in the adoption of management control systems, as the literature has already identified venture 
capitalists (Davila and Foster 2007), suppliers (Chua and Mahama 2007), and alliance partners 
(Chapman and Kihn 2009) as influential third parties. Future research may investigate whether 
and under what conditions different supply chain partners employ the same consulting firms, as a 
means to account for potential differences in the consultant‘s advice. 
I also enhance the understanding of the tools that firms use to enable control and improve 
performance, which is essential to a complete understanding of control (Chapman 2005; 
Chapman and Kihn 2009). Due to the role of the consultant, the adoption of a specific control 
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system may depend not only on the characteristics of the firm, as proposed in the literature, but 
also on the diffusion of the MCS within a specific market. These inferences of this study are 
likely to generalize to a broad range of technologies and practices that consultants advise to 
managers. This range is likely to include the adoption and specific manifestation of financial 
reporting tools such as XBRL, cost management practices such as the Balanced Scorecard, 
control and governance technologies that automate and/or monitor internal controls, and decision 
support technologies such as executive dashboards and business intelligence. 
This dissertation opens multiple avenues for future research into MCS adoption and 
design, and the influence of consultant-recommended MCS. Future research could investigate 
control design as a ―joint product‖ of the manager and consultant. Such inquiry could include 
conditions that influence the manager‘s solicitation and weighting of advice from expert sources, 
including consultants and auditors. One such question could investigate the conditions under 
which managers seek advice that reinforces or challenges the status quo from consultants or 
auditors. It is possible, for example, that managers tailor their solicitation of expert advice; they 
may seek contrary advice from third parties such as consultants, but seek corroborating advice 
from auditors or other sources. 
It is also unknown whether and how the consultant‘s advice influences the manager‘s 
downstream decisions. For example, future research could test whether and how the availability 
of consultant-recommended tools influences the manager‘s choice of performance measures or 
inputs into strategic decision making. Future research also could specify alternative investments 
for the manager and test the manager‘s tendency to actually use investments in management 
control systems, such as the SAP technology in my experimental task, in order to signal their 
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ability to the market. To my knowledge, there has been very little research on the use of control 
design by managers to provide labor market signals.  
I assume a one-shot setting with little prior interaction between the consultant and 
manager. Although this assumption is reasonable for a sales-oriented consulting setting, future 
research could relax this assumption and either allow for familiarity between the parties or allow 
the consultation to occur over multiple periods. Notably, the consulting process often does not 
end after the initial recommendation. If the manager decides to adopt the MCS, then the 
consultant actively assists in the implementation of the tool in a multi-period setting with more 
complex incentives and psychological considerations.  
A multi-period setting not only would allow actors to learn and adjust their behavior, but 
also would open a wider array of persuasion tactics to the actors. For example, multiple periods 
allow for the use of reciprocity, liking, and consistency in order to persuade others (Cialdini 
1993; 2001). It is also likely that the consultant advises a manager whom s/he knows and likes 
differently than a manager whom s/he may not know or like as much. Future research could 
develop a theory to suggest whether consultants are more likely to advise change to a well-liked 
manager, and whether this effect may be particularly pronounced for distinctive or non-
distinctive MCS.  
 This dissertation expands the understanding of how persuasion considerations may shape 
managerial decision settings (cf. Kadous et al. 2005), including the information available to 
managers when they make accounting-relevant decisions. My study opens numerous promising 
routes for future inquiry into the link between consultants‘ advice and persuasion, and the 
general psychological and applied literature would benefit from additional inquiry into settings 
of high resistance and high stakes. Future research could identify additional triggers for 
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persuasion and/or additional persuasion tactics that consultants may use when they advise 
managers to adopt accounting-relevant tools and changes. For instance, the principle of 
consistency suggests that managers may be more likely to change controls if they are made to 
perceive that this change is consistent with their previous actions and choices. It is possible that 
the consultant may be more likely to recommend substantive accounting or control changes after 
observing that the manager has made relatively minor systems changes. Research into this 
possibility may illuminate possible strategies to compel managers to make potentially beneficial 
and substantive changes to their accounting and control systems. 
This study highlights a poorly-understood source of expert advice that managers obtain 
about their controls and accounting systems. As the consultant is one of multiple sources of 
expert advice for the manager, this study enriches our understanding of the influences on 
managers when they make decisions. My findings should be of interest to scholars and 
practitioners in auditing, especially business risk auditing (cf. Bell et al. 2005; Knechel 2007), 
because this advice involves decisions that influence process- and entity-level controls and 
managers‘ perceptions of the effectiveness of these controls. Future research could investigate 
auditors‘ assessments of consultant-advised changes, including the effects of these changes on 
risks associated with internal controls over financial reporting and engagement-level variables 
such as audit fees. Moreover, future research also could examine the potential joint effects of 
different sources of expert advice, such as consultants and auditors, on the control design choices 
of managers. Potentially interesting dependent variables include managers‘ weighting and 
evaluations of advice from different expert sources.  
I note three limitations to the inferences that one can draw from my dissertation, which 
result from assumptions that I make to simplify my research setting. First, neither my theory nor 
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my experimental setting defines the alternative opportunities available to the consultant and 
manager. Accordingly, I do not make economic predictions or claims about the optimality of my 
findings, as I make no claims to have accounted fully for the preferences of the actors. The 
purpose of this study is to test how features of the setting trigger persuasion mechanisms and 
lead to different consultant tendencies to advise and inform managers. It is reasonable, however, 
to assume that persuasion is a primary consideration in the initial process of educating a manager 
about a potential change (Agryis and Kaplan 1994), and study 1 provides evidence that is 
consistent with this observation. 
Second, although there are two ―players‖ in my setting, only the consultant ―moves.‖ In 
combination with a full accounting for the preferences of the ―players,‖ the addition of manager 
decisions would allow the testing of game theoretic strategies, including the potential derivation 
of Pareto or Nash equilibrium strategies for the consultant and the manager. Third, in my setting, 
the manager who decides to adopt the MCS also expects to use the MCS, which differs from a 
setting in which this manager decides to adopt MCS that will only affect the day-to-day tasks of 
subordinates. Future research could test whether and how the consultant‘s advice changes when 
there is a lower expectation that the manager will care about implementation costs. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1 
Graphical Depiction of Experimental Procedures 
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Figure 2 
Results for Tests of Hypotheses 
 
The primary dependent variable is the likelihood with which consultants would advise the firm in the experimental 
case to adopt the Financial Supply Chain Management MCS, measured on a seven point Likert scale.  Higher values 
indicate higher likelihoods.  Distinctiveness is manipulated by informing consultants that either seven (non-
distinctive) or none (distinctive) of the firm‘s competitors have adopted the Financial Supply Chain Management 
tool.  Competence is manipulated by informing consultants that the CFO either has an excellent track record and is 
in high demand in the market (exceptional) or the CFO has an average track record and is in moderate demand 
(average). 
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Figure 3 
Advice to Adopt MCS, Between-Participants Results Only 
 
This figure represents means of the consultant‘s advice to only the first level of the competence manipulation that 
the consultant viewed, thus it displays between-participants results only.  The primary dependent variable is the 
likelihood with which consultants would advise the FSCM system to the manager, measured on a seven point Likert 
scale.  Higher values indicate higher likelihoods.  Distinctiveness is manipulated by informing consultants that 
either seven (non-distinctive) or none (distinctive) of the firm‘s competitors have adopted the Financial Supply 
Chain Management tool.  Competence is manipulated by informing consultants that the CFO either has an excellent 
track record and is in high demand in the market (exceptional) or the CFO has an average track record and is in 
moderate demand (average).   
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Figure 4 
 
The primary dependent variable is the likelihood with which consultants would include information about ―similar 
firms have taken actions similar to your recommendation, if applicable,‖ to support their recommendation to the 
CFO, on a seven-point Likert scale.  Higher values indicate higher likelihoods.  Distinctiveness is manipulated by 
informing consultants that either seven (non-distinctive) or none (distinctive) of the firm‘s competitors have adopted 
the Financial Supply Chain Management MCS.  Competence is manipulated by informing consultants that the CFO 
either has an excellent track record and is in high demand in the market (exceptional) or the CFO has an average 
track record and is in moderate demand (average). 
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Figure 5 
 
The primary dependent variable is the likelihood with which consultants would include information about ―the 
extent to which your solution is customized to the client‖ to support their recommendation to the CFO, on a seven-
point Likert scale.  Higher values indicate higher likelihoods.  Distinctiveness is manipulated by informing 
consultants that either seven (non-distinctive) or none (distinctive) of the firm‘s competitors have adopted the 
Financial Supply Chain Management tool.  Competence is manipulated by informing consultants that the CFO 
either has an excellent track record and is in high demand in the market (exceptional) or the CFO has an average 
track record and is in moderate demand (average). 
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Figure 6 
Results for Likely Benefits of Advice
 
The dependent variable in the table above indicates consultants‘ assessments of the likelihood with which the firm 
would realize improvements on the key performance indicator in question, if the CFO follows consultants‘ advice, 
measured on a seven point Likert scale.  The midpoint of this scale is four, which was anchored by ―Unsure,‖ which 
indicates that the consultant is unsure whether the firm will realize improvements on this KPI.  Higher values 
indicate higher likelihoods.  Days sales outstanding is the likelihood with which the firm will realize improvements 
on days sales outstanding, which firms often compute as (accounts receivable / total credit sales) * # of days in 
period.  Cost is the likelihood with which the firm will reduce the total cost of the accounting function.  
Comparability is the likelihood with which the firm will realize improvements on the ease of cross-divisional 
performance comparison.  Customer satisfaction is the likelihood with which the firm will realize improvements 
on customer satisfaction. Competence is manipulated by informing consultants that the CFO either has an excellent 
track record and is in high demand in the market (exceptional) or the CFO has an average track record and is in 
moderate demand (average).    
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
6
6.5
Cost of
Accounting
Dept
Days Sales
Outstanding
Ease of
Performance
Evaluation
Customer
Satisfaction
L
ik
el
ih
o
o
d
 t
h
a
t 
M
a
n
a
g
er
 w
il
l 
R
ea
li
ze
 
B
en
ef
it
s 
o
n
 K
ey
 P
er
fo
rm
a
n
ce
 I
n
d
ic
a
to
r
 
Predicted Benefits of Advice on Key 
Performance Indicators 
Average
manager
Exceptional
manager
72 
 
Tables 
 
Table 1 
Descriptive Data for Interview Participants 
Participant Title 
Total Exp 
(Years) 
Consulting Exp 
(Years) 
Domain 
Specialization 
Industry 
Specialization 
1 3 14 14 
Finance & 
Acccounting 
Medical Devices, 
Electronics 
2 3 23 23 
Finance & 
Acccounting 
Automotive, Heavy 
Manufacturing 
3 3 26 14 
Logistics / 
Production 
Electronics 
4 3 26 13 
Logistics / 
Production 
Manufacturing, 
Food and Beverage 
5 3 20 13 
Logistics / 
Production 
Chemicals, Oil & 
Gas 
6 3 25 20 
Finance & 
Acccounting 
CPG 
7 3 30 17 
Logistics / 
Production 
Chemicals, 
Manufacturing, 
CPG 
8 2 24 13 
Finance & 
Acccounting 
Aerospace & 
Defense, Metals 
9 2 34 17 
Finance & 
Acccounting 
Pharmaceuticals, 
Manufacturing 
10 2 28 25 
Logistics / 
Production 
Electronics, 
Manufacturing 
11 2 28 13 
Logistics / 
Production 
Automotive, 
Utilities 
12 1 26 13 
Logistics / 
Production 
Medical Devices, 
Industrial Products 
13 1 12 12 
Finance & 
Acccounting 
Manufacturing 
14 1 15 15 
Logistics / 
Production 
Manufacturing 
Mean 
 
23.6 15.9 
  Standard Deviation 6.3 4.1 
  Note on titles: 3 = Partner, Vice President, or Director; 2 = Principal, Associate Partner; 1 = Project Manager 
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Table 2 
Interview Response Data 
 
Panel A: Unprompted Mentions of Control / Organizational Architecture 
Component Frequency Percentage 
Delegation / Decision Making Structure 9 64% 
Measurement / Reporting 7 50% 
Incentives 5 36% 
   Panel B:  Statements about Role of Consultant and Advisory Relationship 
Statement Frequency Percentage 
Role is to change / challenge status quo 13 93% 
Reputation costs 11 79% 
Need to persuade client  10 71% 
Role is to educate manager 7 50% 
Consultant has clear expertise advantage 6 43% 
   Panel C:  Most Important Determinant of Recommendations 
Determinant Frequency Percentage 
Management competence 10 71% 
 
Panel D:  Persuasion Principles and Triggers 
  Statement Frequency Percentage 
Customization 13 93% 
Best practices / social proof 9 64% 
New products and technologies 7 50% 
   
Notes:  
  Panel A summarizes the number of participants who mention various components of organizational architecture 
in the interviews without being prompted.  No responses about OA are explicitly prompted. 
   Panel B summarizes the number of participants who mention aspects of the consultant / manager relationship and 
the expectations of each party. 
   Panel C summarizes responses to the question, "What is the most important variable in determining your 
recommendations and whether they will be adopted successfully?" 
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Table 3 
Descriptive Data for Experiment 
Measure n Mean 
Std 
Dev Min Max 
Demographics: 
     Professional Experience  36 16.72 6.35 7.00 35.00 
CPA / CMA 36 0.19 0.40 0.00 1.00 
PMP 36 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00 
Knowledge of FSCM tool 36 3.92 1.18 1.00 6.00 
Benefits of FSCM tool 36 5.67 0.83 4.00 7.00 
SAP failures are frequent 36 4.53 1.78 1.00 7.00 
Advising change benefits clients 36 6.69 0.58 5.00 7.00 
Clients expect consultant to advise change 36 4.94 1.39 2.00 7.00 
Firm expects consultant to advise change 36 4.69 1.53 1.00 7.00 
      Evaluations of the Case: 
     Similarity to firms you've advised 36 4.89 1.04 2.00 6.00 
Likely resistance to change 36 6.61 0.69 5.00 7.00 
Control effectiveness: managing overall risk 36 2.22 0.76 1.00 4.00 
Control effectiveness: delegating decisions 36 2.56 1.00 1.00 5.00 
Control effectiveness: enabling comparison 36 1.97 1.03 1.00 6.00 
 
Professional experience is consultants‘ self-reported total experience in years.  CPA/CMA is a binary variable of 1 
if the consultant is a Certified Public Accountant or Certified Management Accountant designation, and 0 otherwise.  
PMP is a binary variable of 1 if the consultant has a Project Management Professional certification, and 0 otherwise. 
Knowledge of FSCM tool is consultants‘ assessment of their knowledge of the Financial Supply Chain 
Management tool, relative to consultants with similar experience, measured on a seven point Likert scale.  Higher 
scores indicate greater knowledge.  Benefits of FSCM tool is consultants‘ assessment of how beneficial is the 
Financial Supply Chain Management tool, measured on a seven point Likert scale.  Higher scores indicate greater 
benefits.  SAP failures are frequent measures consultants‘ agreement with the statement that SAP failures occur 
frequently, measured on a seven point Likert scale.  Higher scores indicate greater levels of agreement. Advising 
change benefits client measures consultants‘ agreement with the statement that, by recommending change, the 
consultant benefits his or her clients, measured on a seven point Likert scale.  Higher scores indicate greater levels 
of agreement.  Clients expect consultant to advise change measures consultants‘ agreement with the statement that 
clients expect consultants to recommend change, measured on a seven point Likert scale.  Higher scores indicate 
greater levels of agreement.  Firm expects consultant to advise change measures consultants‘ agreement with the 
statement that the consultant‘s employer expects them to recommend changes to client, measured on a seven point 
Likert scale.  Higher scores indicate greater levels of agreement.  Similarity to firms you’ve advised measures 
consultants‘ assessments of the similarity of the firm in the experimental case to firms the consultants have advised, 
measured on a seven point Likert scale.  Higher scores indicate a greater degree of similarity.  Likely resistance to 
change indicates consultants‘ level of agreement with the statement that resistance by division managers will 
threaten the project‘s success, measured on a seven point Likert scale.  Higher scores indicate greater levels of 
agreement. The three control effectiveness measures indicate consultants‘ assessments of the effectiveness of the 
accounting processes of the firm in the experimental case, prior to any advice by the consultant, measured on a 
seven point Likert scale.  Higher scores indicate greater effectiveness.  
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Table 4 
Consultants’ Advice to Adopt the Tool 
 
Panel A:  Descriptive Statistics – Means, (Standard Deviation), Number of Observations 
 Manager Competence 
Distinctiveness Average Exceptional 
Non-distinctive 5.28 (1.81) n=18 5.17 (1.34) n=18 
Distinctive 3.83 (1.95) n=18 6.00 (1.50) n=18 
 
Panel B:  Analysis of Variance 
Source 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F p 
Between Subjects Effects:      
Distinctiveness 1.68 1 1.68 1.030 0.317 
Error 55.47 34 1.63   
      
Within Subjects Effects      
Competence 19.01 1 19.01 4.86 0.034 
Competence * Distinctiveness 23.35 1 23.35 5.96 0.010 
Error 140.65 34 3.91   
 
Panel C:  Simple Effects Tests 
Source df F p 
 
Source df F p 
H1:  Simple Effect of 
Distinctiveness, given 
Exceptional 
1 3.10 0.044 
 
Simple Effect of 
Competence, 
given Distinctive 
1 21.03 < 0.001 
H2:  Simple Effect of 
Distinctiveness, given 
Average 
1 5.32 0.019 
 
Simple Effect of 
Competence, 
given Non-
distinctive 
1 < 0.01 0.953 
Simple effect and the competence X distinctiveness interaction p values are one-tailed because predictions are 
directional.  All other p-values are two-tailed. 
The primary dependent variable is the likelihood with which consultants would advise the firm in the experimental 
case to adopt the Financial Supply Chain Management tool, measured on a seven point Likert scale.  Higher values 
indicate higher likelihoods.  Distinctiveness is manipulated by informing consultants that either seven (non-
distinctive) or none (distinctive) of the firm‘s competitors have adopted the Financial Supply Chain Management 
tool.  Competence is manipulated by informing consultants that the CFO either has an excellent track record and is 
in high demand in the market (exceptional) or the CFO has an average track record and is in moderate demand 
(average). 
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Table 5: 
Consultants’ Advice to Adopt an MCS (between participants only) 
 
Panel A:  Descriptive Statistics – Means, (Standard Deviation), Number of Observations 
 Manager Competence 
Distinctiveness Average Exceptional 
Non-distinctive 5.90 (1.73) n=10 5.75 (1.04) n=8 
Distinctive 4.63 (1.30) n=8 5.80 (1.87) n=10 
 
Panel B:  Analysis of Variance 
Source 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F p 
Distinctiveness 3.34 1 3.34 1.37 0.250 
Competence 2.34 1 2.34 0.96 0.335 
Distinctiveness X Competence 5.15 1 5.15 2.12 0.078 
Error 77.88 32 2.43   
 
Panel C:  Hypothesis Tests  
Source 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F p 
H1: Effect of distinctiveness, 
given exceptional competence 
0.01 1 0.01 < 0.01 0.473 
H2: Effect of distinctiveness, 
given average competence 
7.23 1 7.23 2.97 0.048 
Simple effect and the competence X distinctiveness interaction p values are one-tailed because predictions are 
directional.  All other p-values are two-tailed.The primary dependent variable is the likelihood with which 
consultants would advise the FSCM system to the manager, measured on a seven point Likert scale.  Higher values 
indicate higher likelihoods.  Distinctiveness is manipulated by informing consultants that either seven (non-
distinctive) or none (distinctive) of the firm‘s competitors have adopted the Financial Supply Chain Management 
tool.  Competence is manipulated by informing consultants that the CFO either has an excellent track record and is 
in high demand in the market (exceptional) or the CFO has an average track record and is in moderate demand 
(average).   
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Table 6: 
Inclusion of Social Proof Information with Advice 
 
Panel A:  Descriptive Statistics – Means, (Standard Deviation), Number of Observations 
 Manager Competence 
Distinctiveness Average Exceptional 
Non-distinctive 5.50 (1.65) n=10 4.50 (1.93) n=8 
Distinctive 6.00 (1.20) n=8 4.50 (1.18) n=10 
 
Panel B:  Analysis of Variance 
Source 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F p 
Distinctiveness 0.56 1 0.56 0.24 0.625 
Competence 13.89 1 13.89 6.09 0.019 
Distinctiveness X Competence 0.56 1 0.56 0.24 0.625 
Error 73.00 32 2.28   
 
ANOVA p values are two-tailed. 
The primary dependent variable is the likelihood with which consultants would include information about the 
actions of other firms in their advice to the manager, measured on a seven point Likert scale.  Higher values indicate 
higher likelihoods.  Distinctiveness is manipulated by informing consultants that either seven (non-distinctive) or 
none (distinctive) of the firm‘s competitors have adopted the Financial Supply Chain Management tool.  
Competence is manipulated by informing consultants that the CFO either has an excellent track record and is in 
high demand in the market (exceptional) or the CFO has an average track record and is in moderate demand 
(average).  Each likelihood is measured on a seven point Likert scale. 
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Table 7: 
Inclusion of Scarcity Information with Advice 
 
Panel A:  Descriptive Statistics – Means, (Standard Deviation), Number of Observations 
 Manager Competence 
Distinctiveness Average Exceptional 
Non-distinctive 4.90 (0.74) n=10 5.38 (1.30) n=8 
Distinctive 5.25 (1.04) n=8 6.40 (.84) n=10 
 
Panel B:  Analysis of Variance 
Source 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F p 
Distinctiveness 4.20 1 4.20 4.38 0.044 
Competence 5.87 1 5.87 6.12 0.019 
Distinctiveness X Competence 1.01 1 1.01 1.06 0.312 
Error 30.68 32 0.96   
 
ANOVA p values are two-tailed. 
The primary dependent variable is the likelihood with which consultants would include information about the level 
of customization of the tool in their advice to the manager, measured on a seven point Likert scale.  Higher values 
indicate higher likelihoods.  Distinctiveness is manipulated by informing consultants that either seven (non-
distinctive) or none (distinctive) of the firm‘s competitors have adopted the Financial Supply Chain Management 
tool.  Competence is manipulated by informing consultants that the CFO either has an excellent track record and is 
in high demand in the market (exceptional) or the CFO has an average track record and is in moderate demand 
(average).  Each likelihood is measured on a seven point Likert scale. 
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Table 8 
Cell Means for Improvements in Key Performance Indicators 
 
Panel A:  Descriptive Statistics – Means, (Standard Deviation), Number of Observations 
 Cost of Accounting Department 
Distinctiveness Average Manager Exceptional Manager 
Non-distinctive 4.17 (1.20) n=18 4.06 (1.43) n=18 
Distinctive 3.94 (1.31) n=18 3.94 (1.47) n=18 
 Days Sales Outstanding 
Distinctiveness Average Manager Exceptional Manager 
Non-distinctive 4.78 (1.26) n=18 5.17 (0.79) n=18 
Distinctive 4.82 (1.10) n=18 5.61 (1.20) n=18 
 Ease of Performance Comparison Across Divisions 
Distinctiveness Average Manager Exceptional Manager 
Non-distinctive 5.89 (1.02) n=18 6.17 (0.92) n=18 
Distinctive 5.67 (0.77) n=18 6.22 (0.84) n=18 
 Customer Satisfaction 
Distinctiveness Average Manager Exceptional Manager 
Non-distinctive 4.72 (1.36) n=18 5.06 (1.43) n=18 
Distinctive 4.61 (0.92) n=18 5.28 (1.23) n=18 
 
Panel B:  Comparisons of Cell Means, Manager Competence 
Key Performance Indicator Average Exceptional t df p 
Cost of Accounting Department 4.06 4.00 -0.32 34 0.751 
Days Sales Outstanding 4.81 5.39 3.62 34 0.001 
Ease of Comparison Across 
Divisions 
5.78 6.25 4.07 
34 
< 0.001 
Customer Satisfaction 4.67 5.17 3.70 34 0.001 
P-values are two-tailed. 
The dependent variable in the tables above indicates consultants‘ assessments of the likelihood with which the firm 
would realize improvements on the key performance indicator in question, if the CFO follows consultants‘ advice, 
measured on a seven point Likert scale.  Higher values indicate higher likelihoods.  
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Table 9 
Consultants’ Advice to Adopt the FSCM Tool w/ days sales outstanding covariate  
 
Panel A:  Analysis of Covariance (inclusion of days sales outstanding) 
Source 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F p 
Between-Subjects Effects      
Distinctiveness 0.79 1 0.79 0.50 0.484 
DSO (Difference btw High and 
Average) 
3.48 1 3.48 2.21 0.147 
Error 51.99 33 1.58   
      
Within-Subjects Effects      
Competence 1.95 1 1.95 0.56 0.459 
Competence * Distinctiveness 14.78 1 14.78 4.67 0.047 
Competence * DSO (Difference 
btw High and Average)) 
18.90 1 18.90 5.46 0.026 
Error 114.24 33 3.462   
 
Panel B:  Effects on Hypothesis Tests 
Source 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F p 
H1:  Simple Effect of 
Distinctiveness, given 
Exceptional: 
4.37 1 4.37 2.20 0.074 
Error 65.42 33 1.98   
      
H2:  Simple Effect of 
Distinctiveness, given Average 
11.20 1 11.20 3.67 0.064 
Error 100.81 33 3.06   
      
 
ANCOVA p values are two-tailed. 
The primary dependent variable is the likelihood with which consultants would advise the firm in the experimental 
case to adopt the Financial Supply Chain Management tool, measured on a seven point Likert scale.  Higher values 
indicate higher likelihoods.  Distinctiveness is manipulated by informing consultants that either seven (non-
distinctive) or none (distinctive) of the firm‘s competitors have adopted the Financial Supply Chain Management 
tool.  Competence is manipulated by informing consultants that the CFO either has an excellent track record and is 
in high demand in the market (exceptional) or the CFO has an average track record and is in moderate demand 
(average).  DSO is the difference score of consultants‘ assessments of the likelihood with which the firm would 
realize improvements on the key performance indicator of ―days sales outstanding,‖ if the CFO follows the 
consultant‘s advice.  Each likelihood is measured on a seven point Likert scale. 
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Table 10 
Consultants’ Advice to Adopt the FSCM Tool w/ improved comparability covariate  
 
Panel A:  Analysis of Covariance (inclusion of comparability) 
Source 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F p 
Between-Subjects Effects      
Distinctiveness 1.52 1 1.52 .90 0.349 
Comparability  < 0.01 1 < 0.01 < 0.01 0.976 
Error 55.47 33 1.68   
      
Within-Subjects Effects      
Competence 0.13 1 0.13 0.04 0.841 
Competence * Distinctiveness 9.52 1 9.52 3.04 0.090 
Competence * Comparability  29.90 1 29.90 9.56 0.004 
Error 103.24 33 3.13   
      
 
Panel B:  Effects on Hypothesis Tests 
Source 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F p 
H1:  Simple Effect of 
Distinctiveness, given 
Exceptional: 
1.72 1 1.72 1.05 0.156 
Error 53.77 33 1.63   
      
H2:  Simple Effect of 
Distinctiveness, given Average 
9.32 1 9.32 2.93 0.048 
Error 104.94 33 3.18   
      
 
ANCOVA p values are two-tailed. 
The primary dependent variable is the likelihood with which consultants would advise the firm in the experimental 
case to adopt the Financial Supply Chain Management tool, measured on a seven point Likert scale.  Higher values 
indicate higher likelihoods.  Distinctiveness is manipulated by informing consultants that either seven (non-
distinctive) or none (distinctive) of the firm‘s competitors have adopted the Financial Supply Chain Management 
tool.  Competence is manipulated by informing consultants that the CFO either has an excellent track record and is 
in high demand in the market (exceptional) or the CFO has an average track record and is in moderate demand 
(average).  Comparability is the difference score of consultants‘ assessments of the likelihood with which the firm 
would realize improvements on the key performance indicator of ―ease of comparison across divisions,‖ if the CFO 
follows the consultant‘s advice.  Each likelihood is measured on a seven point Likert scale.  
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Table 11 
Consultants’ Advice to Adopt the FSCM Tool w/ improved customer satisfaction covariate  
 
Panel A:  Analysis of Covariance (inclusion of customer satisfaction) 
Source 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F p 
Between-Subjects Effects      
Distinctiveness 2.25 1 2.25 1.37 0.251 
Customer Satisfaction  1.22 1 1.22 0.74 0.395 
Error 54.25 33 1.64   
      
Within-Subjects Effects      
Competence 2.79 1 2.79 0.77 0.386 
Competence * Distinctiveness 15.61 1 15.61 4.32 0.046 
Competence * Customer 
Satisfaction 
13.83 1 13.83 3.83 0.059 
Error 119.31 33 3.62   
      
 
Panel B:  Effects on Hypothesis Tests 
Source 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F p 
H1:  Simple Effect of 
Distinctiveness, given 
Exceptional: 
3.01 1 3.01 1.74 0.098 
Error 56.86 33 1.72   
      
H2:  Simple Effect of 
Distinctiveness, given Average 
14.84 1 14.84 4.20 0.025 
Error 116.70 33 3.54   
      
 
ANCOVA p values are two-tailed. 
The primary dependent variable is the likelihood with which consultants would advise the firm in the experimental 
case to adopt the Financial Supply Chain Management tool, measured on a seven point Likert scale.  Higher values 
indicate higher likelihoods.  Distinctiveness is manipulated by informing consultants that either seven (non-
distinctive) or none (distinctive) of the firm‘s competitors have adopted the Financial Supply Chain Management 
tool.  Competence is manipulated by informing consultants that the CFO either has an excellent track record and is 
in high demand in the market (exceptional) or the CFO has an average track record and is in moderate demand 
(average).  Customer Satisfaction is the difference score of consultants‘ assessments of the likelihood with which 
the firm would realize improvements on the key performance indicator of ―customer satisfaction,‖ if the CFO 
follows the consultant‘s advice.  Each likelihood is measured on a seven point Likert scale.  
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Appendix A 
List of Interview Questions from Study 1 
1. What do you believe is the primary service that you provide to your clients?  What do 
firms and managers expect to get when they hire a consultant? 
 
2. Is there a difference between what clients expect to get and what you believe they should 
expect?  Do clients have reasonable expectations?  Do they expect too much from 
consultants or the products that consultants provide? 
 
3. On what aspects of their business do managers and firms tend to hire consultants?  What 
aspects of the business do consultant‘s recommendations tend to concern? 
 
4. To what degree do clients communicate and define their expectations to the consultant?  
How do clients do this?  To what degree can the consultant shape these expectations?   
 
5. To what extent do clients know what they want from the consultant‘s product and/or the 
consultant‘s advice?  How do you know? 
 
6. How do you adapt your recommendations to the needs of a particular client?  Are there 
any indicators that give you a sense of what solutions might be beneficial to a client?  
Characteristics of the firms? 
 
7. How frequently do clients disagree with your judgments and how do you manage these 
disagreements?  Do you ever go over your client‘s head in order to make a consulting 
engagement successful? 
 
8. What is the most important variable in determining what to recommend and whether your 
recommendations will be adopted successfully? 
 
9. On what dimensions do the consulting firms evaluate the performance of individual 
consultants?  Are there any dimensions that you would change, or would you add any 
dimensions? 
 
Note:  The interview questions were intended to be open-ended.  The interviews included many 
follow-up questions that are not included on this list, as follow-ups were tailored to individual 
responses. 
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Appendix B 
 
Experimental Instrument from Study 2 
THANK YOU! 
This survey is part of my dissertation at the University of Illinois, and your help is instrumental in completing my 
degree. 
This case is confidential and hypothetical, but try to assume that you are making actual decisions. 
Please click the button below to continue. 
Your Task 
Assume that you have been asked to assist business development activities related to SAP's Financial Supply Chain 
Management (FSCM) tool.  As you know, FSCM is a tool that allows firms to consolidate and automate their credit 
management and collections. 
The Chief Financial Officer (CFO) of ABC Manufacturing, Inc. may be interested in adopting FSCM, and has sent 
you a Request for Proposals (RFP).  The RFP relates to Order to Cash issues that arise from ABC's decentralized 
structure, especially its decentralized credit management processes.   
Your firm wants you to take a shot at the RFP.  Do not worry if you are not an expert in SAP FSCM.  
ABC Manufacturing, Inc. Background 
ABC Manufacturing Inc. is a privately-held firm headquartered in Kutztown, Pennsylvania. ABC has a hybrid low-
cost / product differentiation strategy to provide top-quality products at reasonable prices. 
  
ABC's products are customized for each customer and, in many cases, for each order.  Its primary products include: 
  
·         Barcode and serialized labels 
·         Safety and tamper-indicating labels 
·         Brand-indicating and brand protection labels (e.g. holograms) 
·         RFID tags 
  
  
ABC's revenue has grown from $275 million in 2001, when its founder stepped aside as CEO, to $710 million in 
2010 (11% average growth per year).  The growth has been organic.  ABC has increased revenue from its long-
standing customers in the storage media, electronics, and semiconductor industries, and has expanded into the 
pharmaceuticals and life sciences industries. 
  
ABC has five divisions, one for each of the five industries that it serves.  Revenue and growth rates are similar 
across divisions.  The firm plans to expand its product lines in the near future, in order to continue its growth. 
  
ABC'S Decentralized Structure 
  
Division managers have substantial authority, including over the SAP system, which has led each division to run a 
different instance of SAP.  
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ABC‘s accounting and finance function is mostly decentralized.  Its corporate HQ manages financial reporting, 
taxation, and internal audit, but each division has its own accounting and finance department with substantial 
autonomy over the order to cash, procure to pay, and record to report cycles. 
  
Division managers like this decentralized structure.  They claim that it makes accounting responsive to unique 
business needs. 
  
  
THE PROBLEM 
  
Each division has its own credit and collections policies.  Since ABC‘s products are customized, customer disputes 
occur frequently as a natural aspect of business.  Combined with the decentralized structure, these disputes make 
managing cash flow difficult.  It takes substantial effort to manage and track disputes, and disputes often result in 
large and unpredictable deductions.  It is also difficult for the CFO to make comparisons across divisions.  
  
Also, these disputes may adversely affect customer satisfaction, which is very important to ABC. 
 
The CFO is skeptical of the benefits of decentralized accounting, and wants a solution that efficiently and 
effectively: 
  
·         Manages disputes and cash flow 
·         Supports ABC‘s future growth plans 
  
The CFO is most concerned about these key performance indicators: 
  
·         Days Sales Outstanding (DSO), which is above the industry average 
·         Total cost of the accounting and finance function, which is above the industry average 
  
The CFO has been at ABC for 5 years.   
 
Competence Manipulation: 
 
Average:  Based on your information, the CFO is an average manager.  He has an average track record 
and is in moderate demand by other firms. 
 
Exceptional:  Based on your information, the CFO is a star.  He has an excellent track and is in high demand 
by other firms. 
 
He may seek a job in a larger firm, after the credit management issues have been resolved.  
  
ABC competes with 10 other firms that are comparable to ABC in size, strategy, and market share.  All use SAP. 
  
Distinctiveness Manipulation: 
 
Non-distinctive:  Seven of ABC’s competitors have adopted FSCM, and have consolidated and automated 
these processes. 
 
Distinctive:  None of ABC’s competitors have adopted FSCM yet, and have not consolidated and automated 
these processes. 
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Questions 
 
Rate the effectiveness of ABC's current accounting and finance structure on the following criteria: 
 
   
   1.   
Very 
Ineffective  
2. 
Ineffective  
3. 
Somewhat 
Ineffective  
4. 
Neither 
Effective 
nor 
Ineffective  
5. 
Somewhat 
Effective  
6. 
Effective  
7. 
Very 
Effective  
Controls risks to ABC's 
overall objectives  
      
       
Gives decision authority to 
the right personnel  
      
       
Enables HQ to compare 
division performance  
      
       
 
How likely are you to recommend that ABC:  
         
1. 
Very 
unlikely  
2. 
Unlikely  
3. 
Somewhat 
unlikely  
4. 
Undecided  
5. 
Somewhat 
likely  
6. 
Likely  
7. 
Very likely  
Adopt Financial Supply 
Chain Management?  
      
       
Change its accounting and 
finance processes?  
      
       
 
What degree of change would you recommend to ABC's accounting and finance processes?  
1  
Very small 
degree of 
change  
2  3  4  
Moderate 
degree of 
change  
5  6  7  
Very large 
degree of 
change  
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Please provide a brief statement (i.e. a sentence or two) about what ABC should do (e.g. upgrade? 
reimplementation? centralize or decentralize? alternatives to FSCM?):  
 
Please evaluate the CFO's  
         
1  
Very low  
2  3  4  
Moderate  
5  6  7  
Very high  
Competence        
       
Ability to implement your 
recommendations  
      
       
 
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?  
      
   1. 
Strongly 
Disagree  
2. 
Disagree  
3. 
Somewhat 
Disagree  
4. 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree  
5. 
Somewhat 
Agree  
6. 
Agree  
7. 
Strongly 
Agree  
The CFO will follow your 
recommendations.  
      
       
Resistance by division 
managers will threaten the 
project's success.  
      
       
Your recommendation will 
give ABC a competitive 
advantage.  
      
       
You can persuade the CFO 
by calling attention to what 
competitors have done.  
      
       
FSCM is widely-adopted in 
ABC's industry.  
      
       
It would damage your 
reputation if this project 
fails.  
      
       
This project will be 
successful.  
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Assume the CFO follows your recommendations.  Rate the effectiveness of ABC's accounting and finance 
structure on the following criteria:  
         
1. 
Very 
Ineffective  
2. 
Ineffective  
3. 
Somewhat 
Ineffective  
4. 
Neither 
Effective 
nor 
Ineffective  
5. 
Somewhat 
Effective  
6. 
Effective  
7. 
Very 
Effective  
Controls risk to ABC's 
overall objectives  
      
       
Gives decision 
authority to the right 
personnel  
      
       
Enables HQ to 
compare division 
performance  
      
       
 
 
Assume the CFO follows your recommendations.  How likely is ABC to improve these indicators?  
         
1. 
Very 
Unlikely  
2. 
Unlikely  
3. 
Somewhat 
Unlikely  
4. 
Undecided  
5. 
Somewhat 
Likely  
6. 
Likely  
7. 
Very 
Likely  
Days sales outstanding        
       
Cost of the accounting and 
finance function  
      
       
Easy cross-division 
performance comparisons  
      
       
Customer satisfaction        
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How likely are you to emphasize the following information in the RFP, to support your recommendations?  
         
1. 
Very 
Unlikely  
2. 
Unlikely  
3. 
Somewhat 
Unlikely  
4. 
Undecided  
5. 
Somewhat 
Likely  
6. 
Likely  
7. 
Very Likely  
Your own expertise        
       
Similar firms have 
taken actions similar to 
your recommendation, 
if applicable  
      
       
The competitive 
advantage that the 
client will gain, if 
applicable  
      
       
The extent to which 
your solution is 
customized to the 
client  
      
       
 
How much would it cost for the CFO to adopt your recommendation, relative to the average cost of Financial 
Supply Chain Management projects?  
1. Substantially less  2. Less  3. About the same  4. More  5. Substantially more  
     
Select the appropriate range for ABC's cost to adopt your recommendations.  
$300K or less  
$301K to $750K  
$751K to $1.5M  
$1.5M to $5.0M  
$5.1M or greater 
 
What is the biggest mistake that the CFO could make in this situation?  
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After hearing your recommendations, the CFO sends you the following message: 
 
 
 
 
"You are one of four finalists (out of eight firms who provided proposals).   I would like to invite you to our 
headquarters, along with an FSCM expert from your firm, to give a more detailed presentation."  
 
 
 
  
Although your firm will reward you for winning this deal, a trip to ABC's headquarters, along with the 
engagement of a subject matter expert, would be costly. 
 
How likely are you to invest the time and resources necessary to win this deal? 
 
 
 
1. 
Very Unlikely 
2. 
Unlikely 
3. 
Somewhat 
Unlikely 
4. 
Undecided 
5. 
Somewhat Likely 
6. 
Likely 
7. 
Very Likely 
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WITHIN-PARTICIPANTS MANIPULATION: 
 
IF THE PARTICIPANT RECEIVED THE HIGH COMPETENCE MANIPULATION FIRST: 
 
Assume that the CFO is an average manager, instead of a star.  Assume that he has an average track record 
and is in moderate demand by other firms, instead of an excellent track record and being in high demand. 
  
He may still seek a job in a larger firm, after the credit management issues have been resolved. 
 
IF THE PARTICIPANT RECEIVED THE MODERATE COMPETNCE MANIPULATION FIRST: 
 
Assume that the CFO is a star, instead of an average manager.  Assume that he has an excellent track record 
and is in high demand by other firms, instead of an average track record and being in moderate demand. 
  
He may still seek a job in a larger firm, after the credit management issues have been resolved.  
 
How likely are you to recommend that ABC:  
         
1. 
Very 
unlikely  
2. 
Unlikely  
3. 
Somewhat 
unlikely  
4. 
Undecided  
5. 
Somewhat 
likely  
6. 
Likely  
7. 
Very likely  
Adopt Financial Supply 
Chain Management?  
      
       
Change its accounting and 
finance processes?  
      
       
What degree of change would you recommend to ABC's accounting and finance processes?  
1  
Very small 
degree of 
change  
2  3  4  
Moderate 
degree of 
change  
5  6  7  
Very large 
degree of 
change  
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Please provide a brief statement (i.e. a sentence or two) about what ABC should do (e.g. upgrade? 
reimplementation? centralize or decentralize? alternatives to FSCM?):  
 
Please evaluate the CFO's  
         
1  
Very low  
2  3  4  
Moderate  
5  6  7  
Very high  
Competence        
       
Ability to implement your 
recommendations  
      
       
 
Assume the CFO follows your recommendations.  How likely is ABC to improve these indicators?  
         
1. 
Very 
Unlikely  
2. 
Unlikely  
3. 
Somewhat 
Unlikely  
4. 
Undecided  
5. 
Somewhat 
Likely  
6. 
Likely  
7. 
Very 
Likely  
Days sales outstanding        
       
Cost of the accounting and 
finance function  
      
       
Easy cross-division 
performance comparisons  
      
       
Customer satisfaction        
       
 
How much would it cost for the CFO to adopt your recommendation, relative to the average cost of Financial 
Supply Chain Management projects?  
1. Substantially less  2. Less  3. About the same  4. More  5. Substantially more  
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POST-TEST QUESTIONS 
 
How many years (months) of professional experience do you have?  
 
How many years (months) of consulting experience do you have?  
 
What is your current rank?  
 
Partner / Director / VP  
 
Senior / Associate Consultant  
 
Principal / Associate Partner  
 
Other, please specify  
 
Manager / Managing Consultant      
Which option best describes your job responsibilities?  
Sales  Delivery  Sales and Delivery  Operations  
    
Do you have any of the following certifications?  
CPA / CMA  PMP  CPIM / CSCP  
   
Are you currently a 1099 independent contractor?  
Yes  
No 
Relative to consultants with similar experience, how knowledgeable are you about SAP Financial Supply 
Chain Management?  
1  
Not at all 
knowledgeable  
2  3  4  
Moderately 
knowledgeable  
5  6  7  
Extremely 
knowledgeable  
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How beneficial is SAP Financial Supply Chain Management?  
1  
Not at all 
beneficial  
2  3  4  
Moderately 
beneficial  
5  6  7  
Extremely 
beneficial  
       
How similar is ABC to other firms that you have advised?  
1  
Not at all 
similar  
2  3  4  
Moderately 
similar 
5  6  7  
Extremely 
similar 
       
 
Indicate your level of agreement with the following statements.  
         
1. 
Strongly 
Disagree  
2. 
Disagree  
3. 
Somewhat 
Disagree  
4. 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree  
5. 
Somewhat 
Agree  
6. 
Agree  
7. 
Strongly 
Agree  
SAP implementation failures 
occur frequently.  
      
       
By recommending change, I 
benefit my clients.  
      
       
By recommending change, I 
benefit myself.  
      
       
Consultants are supposed to 
recommend change  
      
       
Clients expect consultants 
like me to recommend 
change.  
      
       
 
